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\par \pard \f1 \fs20 \hyphpar0 242 F.3d 642, *; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2594, **\qc 
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\par \f1 \fs20 \cf \b0 \i0 \ul0 \pard \hyphpar0 \qc \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 4 of 5 DOCUMENTS
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\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 CHARLES FREEMAN and ROSALYN BROWN, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. CITY OF DALLAS, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
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\par \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 No. 97-10907
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\par \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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\par \b \i \ul0 \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 242 F.3d 642\b \i0 \ul0 ; \b \i \ul0 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2594\b \i0 \ul0 
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\par \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 February 22, 2001, Decided 
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\sect \sectd \marglsxn1296\sbknone \cols2 \colsx432 \b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: \b0 \i0 \ul0     [**1]  As Revised March 5, 2001.  Certiorari Denied October 1, 2001, Reported at: \b0 \i \ul0 2001 U.S. LEXIS 5547\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 PRIOR HISTORY: \b0 \i0 \ul0    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. 3:96-CV-1108-DES. Dale E Saffels, US District Judge.  
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\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 DISPOSITION: \b0 \i0 \ul0    Judgment against City REVERSED.  
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\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 COUNSEL: \b0 \i0 \ul0 For CHARLES FREEMAN, ROSALYN BROWN, Plaintiffs - Appellees-Cross-Appellants: Michael W Daniel, Laura Beth Beshara, Dallas, TX.
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\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 For CITY OF DALLAS, Defendant - Appellant-Cross-Appellee: Peter Brooke Haskel, City Attorney's Office, City of Dallas, Dallas, TX. William Kent McIlyar, Office of the City Attorney for the City of Dallas, Dallas, TX.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 CITY OF HOUSTON, Amicus Curiae: Andrea Joan Capps Douglas, City of Houston, Legal Department, Houston, TX.  
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\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 JUDGES: \b0 \i0 \ul0 Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, JONES, SMITH, WIENER, BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, BENAVIDES, STEWART, PARKER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. \fs16 \super *\fs20 \nosupersub  DENNIS, Circuit Judge, with whom WIENER, BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges, join in Part I only, dissenting.
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\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 *   Chief Judge King did not participate in this decision.
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\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 OPINION BY: \b0 \i0 \ul0 EDITH H. JONES
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\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 OPINION
\par \b0 \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [*644]  EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The City of Dallas served notices on the owners of two vacant, deteriorated apartment houses, warning them to repair or demolish the structures. The owners fought the order according to City procedures but lost. After the City tore down the condemned buildings, the owners filed suit in federal court alleging violations of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  and the Due Process Clause. A divided panel of this court held that although the City procedures complied with due process, the City must also obtain a pre-demolition warrant of some sort in order to satisfy the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 . This court, sitting en banc, disagrees with the panel majority's interpretation of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  [**2]  and denies relief to the property owners. A warrant is unnecessary when a municipality seizes property that has been declared a nuisance 
\sect 
\page  [*645]  by means of established police power procedures.
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\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 I.\b0 \i0 \ul0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Between December 1992 and April 1993, Rosalyn Brown acquired two vacant, eight-unit apartment buildings in Dallas, Texas located at 2621 and 2611 Meyers Street. Brown paid $ 10.00 for the first building and $ 1.00 for the second, which had suffered fire damage prior to purchase. On August 11, 1994, Brown transferred a one percent undivided interest in both buildings to her brother, Charles Freeman. The buildings remained vacant during the entire period of plaintiffs' ownership.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Brown intended to rent the apartment units after making repairs. To this end, she asked Freeman to be the general contractor in charge of renovating the apartments. Freeman was neither a registered engineer or architect, nor did he possess a general contractor's license or trade license from the State of Texas. No construction company or crew worked for him.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In April and July of 1993, inspectors from the Dallas Department of Housing and Neighborhood Services (the "Department") cited the plaintiffs' two apartment [**3]  buildings for non-compliance with the City's Minimum Urban Rehabilitation Standards Code (the "Code"). According to the Department's inspectors, the buildings together needed nearly $ 200,000 in repairs to comply with the Code. When the Code violations were not corrected, the Department referred the matter to the Urban Rehabilitation Standards Board ("URSB") and recommended demolition.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The URSB was established by the City of Dallas to determine whether property condition reports filed by city inspectors identify violations of the City's building codes. The URSB comprises thirty private citizen members (and eight alternates) who are appointed by the Dallas City Council. The URSB may determine, after a hearing, whether a given structure is an "urban nuisance" and take various remedial measures. The URSB is authorized by city ordinance to order repairs, receivership, the closing and vacating of buildings, demolition, and civil penalties of up to two thousand dollars a day against property owners who fail to repair or demolish a structure after the board has issued a valid determination and remedial order. DALLAS, TEX., CODE ch. 27, art. II, \'a7 27-8.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The URSB functions through hearing [**4]  panels composed of members of the URSB. The Dallas City Code establishes the procedure to be used by the panels. At a hearing, "an owner, lessor, occupant, or lienholder may present witnesses in his own behalf and is entitled to cross-examine any witnesses appearing against him." DALLAS, TEX., CODE ch. 27, art. II, \'a7 27-9(c). The decision of the hearing panel is final except that rehearings may be granted in certain instances. The code also gives an affected property owner an absolute right to appeal the panel decision to state district court. DALLAS, TEX., CODE ch. 27, art. II, \'a7 27-9(e). Under state law, the court considers whether the landowner's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the URSB decision violates constitutional or statutory law; exceeds URSB's authority; is based on unlawful procedure or any other error of law; is unsupported by substantial evidence; or is arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion. \b0 \i \ul0 TEXAS GOV'T CODE \'a7 2001.174(2)\b0 \i0 \ul0 .
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 After receiving the Department's reports on plaintiffs' properties, the URSB conducted a title search and mailed a notice of hearing on each of the properties to the owner of record. \fs16 \super 1\fs20 \nosupersub  The notice announced 
\sect 
\page  [*646]  that the URSB [**5]  might order demolition to remedy the Code offenses. It further stated that the property owner would "be given an opportunity to present evidence and witnesses if so desired."
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\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 1   Freeman did not get notice because he had no interest in either property at this time. Brown received a notice on 2621 Meyers Street, the property of which she was the owner of record. Brown did not receive notice on the 2611 Meyers Street property because, although she had purchased the property by this date, she had not yet filed a warranty deed. Instead, the notice on 2611 Meyers Street was sent to the owner of record, Robert Burkhead.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In preparation for the hearings, Department staffers briefed the panel of URSB members assigned to decide the fate of the Meyers Street properties. They provided the panel members with information on the properties, including repair cost estimates, and accompanied some of them on a tour of the premises.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Freeman appeared at the hearings, identifying himself as the "attorney-in-fact for Brown" and as [**6]  an owner of 2611 and 2621 Meyers Street. The panel looked at pictures of the structures, questioned Freeman about his plans for repair, and asked whether he had the funds for repair. Freeman testified that he lacked funds at present and asked for more time to make repairs. Expressing doubt about Freeman's ownership and his ability to finance repairs, the panel unanimously voted to demolish each apartment building as an urban nuisance. \fs16 \super 2\fs20 \nosupersub 
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\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 2   The Code defines an "urban nuisance" as the following:
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li1200\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    A premises or structure that:
\par \pard \qj \li1200\ri600 \sb120 \fi360 (A) is reasonably dangerous to the physical health or safety of an occupant or other person; or
\par \pard \qj \li1200\ri600 \sb120 \fi360 (B) because of violations of the Code . . ., its state of disrepair is such that it could reasonably cause injury, damage, harm, or inconvenience to a considerable portion of the community in the use and enjoyment of property, materially interfering with the proper use or comfort and enjoyment of surrounding property, taking into consideration the nature and use of the properties in the area and the character of the community in which they are situated, which condition would be substantially offensive and annoying to persons of ordinary sensibilities, tastes, and habits living in the community.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 DALLAS, TEX., CODE ch. 27, art. I, \'a7 27-3(23).
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The Code goes on to prescribe with specificity the minimum structural, health and utility standards whose breach may result in the declaration of an urban nuisance. Dallas, Tex., Code ch. 27, Art. III, \'a7 27-11.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [**7]  Following the hearing, Freeman signed notices of demolition for both apartment buildings. He then asked for and received a rehearing from the URSB. Two panel members visited the properties before the rehearings. They examined the exterior of the apartment building at 2611 Meyers Street. At 2621 Meyers Street, they ran into Freeman. He showed them repairs he had made inside that property, and they told him to bring pictures of these repairs to the rehearings.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 At the rehearing, the Department showed pictures of the apartment buildings' exteriors. In response, Freeman testified that he thought he could acquire most of the repair materials at little or no cost. He further stated that he hoped to finance repairs through a loan from the City; he had received a commitment from relatives in the construction business to help him make repairs if he received a City loan.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Freeman also submitted pictures of one unit in the 2621 Meyers Street building that he had repaired, and he presented a list of repair materials that he had already collected. He further testified that he could renovate each unit at 2621 Meyers Street for $ 2000. Though panel members reacted skeptically and reminded him of [**8]  the Department's repair cost estimates, Freeman did not inquire about the basis for these estimates nor did he ask to question the Department officials responsible for them.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The panel again voted to demolish plaintiffs' buildings. The vote was unanimous on the 2611 Meyers Street property and was split five to two on the 2621 Meyers Street property. Freeman received a notice of demolition for each property at the end of the rehearing, and he signed them. The notice advised that the panel's decision could be appealed within twenty days to state district court for review. Freeman 
\sect 
\page  [*647]  and Brown did not appeal the URSB decision to state district court. \fs16 \super 3\fs20 \nosupersub 
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\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 3   The URSB also sent notice of the order to demolish the building at 2611 Meyers Street to Freeman and notice of the order to demolish the building at 2621 Meyers Street to Freeman and Brown. The notices stated, in part:
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li1200\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    If you do not demolish the structure(s) within the time above indicated 30 days, the city will arrange to have this work done and the expense of that demolition performed under contract with the city will constitute a lien on the real property on which the structure(s) were located, and that lien will run with the land.
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\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 These notices were sent to the same addresses at which Brown and Freeman had received mail about earlier hearings, but they were returned as "Unclaimed."
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [**9]  When Brown and Freeman failed to demolish the buildings within thirty days, the City hired a contractor to do the work. The two vacant structures were demolished in late December 1994, and the costs of the demolition were assessed against Freeman and Brown in the total amount of about $ 16,000.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 A year and a half later, Freeman and Brown filed suit against the City of Dallas under \b0 \i \ul0 42 U.S.C. \'a7 1983\b0 \i0 \ul0 . They alleged that the demolition of their apartment buildings without first obtaining a judicial warrant constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 . They also alleged that the URSB's procedure for condemning and demolishing their apartment buildings and for imposing liens on the remaining realty denied them procedural due process in violation of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fifth\b0 \i0 \ul0  and \b0 \i \ul0 Fourteenth Amendments\b0 \i0 \ul0 .
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Freeman and Brown moved for summary judgment on the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  claim while the City moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion on the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  claim and granted the City's motion on the Due Process claims. Following a one-day trial on damages for the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  violation, the district court [**10]  accepted the jury's verdict and entered final judgment against the City of Dallas in the amount of $ 20,000 plus interest.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 A divided panel of this Court affirmed the district court's summary judgment for the property owners with respect to the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  claim, while also affirming the rejection of the plaintiffs' Due Process claims. \fs16 \super 4\fs20 \nosupersub  \b0 \i \ul0 See\b0 \i0 \ul0  \b0 \i \ul0 Freeman v. City of Dallas, 186 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 1999)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , reh'g en banc granted, \b0 \i \ul0 200 F.3d 884 (5th Cir. 1999)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . We granted rehearing en banc to reconsider the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  ruling.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 4   This court reinstates the panel opinion concerning the Due Process claims.
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 II. DISCUSSION\b0 \i0 \ul0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The panel majority reasoned toward a violation of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  in three steps. First, the demolition of the Freemans' apartment houses was a "seizure" for \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  purposes. Second, the seizure had to be preceded by a warrant. Third, a warrantless seizure, even if it occurred following constitutionally adequate local condemnation procedures,  [**11]  is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. While we agree that the City seized the Freemans' real property for demolition, \fs16 \super 5\fs20 \nosupersub  we do not accede to the panel majority's inflexible warrant requirement in this context or its supplanting of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  reasonableness inquiry with such a requirement. The text of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  conspicuously fails to require a warrant for every government search or seizure. And the controlling 
\sect 
\page  [*648]  caselaw emphasizes reasonableness, a balancing of governmental versus private interests, as the touchstone of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 .
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\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 5   "Seizure" of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property, \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and a "seizure" may occur in both civil and criminal contexts. There can be no question that the city's actions against the Freeman's apartment buildings constituted a "seizure". \b0 \i \ul0 See\b0 \i0 \ul0  \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 62\b0 \i0 \ul0  & n.7, \b0 \i \ul0 113 S. Ct. 538, 544\b0 \i0 \ul0  & n.7, \b0 \i \ul0 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , (holding that the forcible removal of a mobile home, leaving the owners dispossessed, constituted a "seizure" under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 ).
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [**12]  Since the relevant facts are undisputed, summary judgment was granted on the merits as a matter of law, \b0 \i \ul0 see\b0 \i0 \ul0  \b0 \i \ul0 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . We review the district court's decision \b0 \i \ul0 de novo\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \b0 \i \ul0 See\b0 \i0 \ul0  \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1061, 1063 (5th Cir. 1998)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , made applicable to the States by the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourteenth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , \b0 \i \ul0 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1628, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , declares:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and \b \i0 \ul0 no Warrants\b0 \i0 \ul0  shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 This provision contains two separate and independent clauses. The first proscribes "unreasonable searches and seizures," and the second prescribes the narrow conditions under which a warrant may issue. Nothing in the text suggests that warrants are required for every search or seizure, nor is the existence of a warrant a\b0 \i \ul0  sine qua non\b0 \i0 \ul0  for a reasonable search or seizure. While [**13]  the text plainly mandates reasonableness in the seizure, it does not instruct whether a warrant is necessary to ensure the reasonableness of the City's demolition order.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 To determine the necessity of a warrant here, we might consider common law at the time the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  was adopted, \b0 \i \ul0 see\b0 \i0 \ul0  \b0 \i \ul0 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , but, contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, the quest would be fruitless. Confusing the demands of due process with the warrant clause, plaintiffs' historical argument observes that, at common law, apart from cases where a nuisance posing an imminent danger could be summarily abated by self-help, structures were ordinarily determined to be nuisances in criminal or civil abatement actions. Because the courts at the time of the framing of the Constitution oversaw nuisance law, plaintiffs assume that they must continue constitutionally to play a role under the aegis of the Warrant Clause. There are two serious flaws in this argument. First, none of the cases cited by the plaintiffs deals with warrants. \fs16 \super 6\fs20 \nosupersub  Instead, cases from the nineteenth century involved judicial review to determine whether [**14]  structures or activities were in fact injurious under state and local police power. \fs16 \super 7\fs20 \nosupersub  Other cases evaluated nuisance determinations by the standards of procedural and substantive due process. \fs16 \super 8\fs20 \nosupersub  
\sect 
\page  [*649]  Whatever these cases may imply about the historical view of the reasonableness of particular nuisance decisions, they say nothing about employing the Warrant Clause to review those decisions.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 6   The federal government lacked authority over nuisances at and after the time of the framing, and the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  was not first applied to the states until 1961.  \b0 \i \ul0 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-47, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1686-87, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 7   \b0 \i \ul0 See\b0 \i0 \ul0  \b0 \i \ul0 Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497, 505, 19 L. Ed. 984 (1870)\b0 \i0 \ul0  ("It is a doctrine not to be tolerated in this country, that a municipal corporation, without any general laws either of the city or of the State, within which a given structure can be shown to be a nuisance, can, by its mere declaration that it is one, subject it to removal by any person supposed to be aggrieved, or even by the city itself."); \b0 \i \ul0 Hennessy v. St. Paul, 37 F. 565, 566 (C.C. Minn. 1889)\b0 \i0 \ul0  ("Unless a nuisance, as defined by the common law or by statute, exists, the act of the common council cannot make it one by a mere resolution. Such a doctrine might place the property of the people, no matter what in fact might be its real condition and character, at the disposal of the common council, without compensation."); \b0 \i \ul0 Underwood v. Green, 42 N.Y. 140 (N.Y. 1870)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; J.E. Macy, Annotation, \b0 \i \ul0 Constitutional Rights of Owner as Against Destruction of Building by Public Authorities\b0 \i0 \ul0 , 14 A.L.R.2d 73, *8 (1950) ("Neither at common law nor under such express power can it, by its mere declaration that specified property is a nuisance, make it one when in fact it is not.").
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  [**15] 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 8   \b0 \i \ul0 See, e.g.,\b0 \i0 \ul0  \b0 \i \ul0 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 141, 14 S. Ct. 499, 502, 38 L. Ed. 385 (1894)\b0 \i0 \ul0  ("If the property were of great value . . . it would be putting a dangerous power in the hands of a custom officer to permit him to sell or destroy it as a public nuisance, and the owner would have good reason to complain of such act as depriving him of his property without due process of law."); \b0 \i \ul0 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273, 301, 31 L. Ed. 205 (1887)\b0 \i0 \ul0  ("The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a person of his property without due process of law."); \b0 \i \ul0 Our House v. The State, 4 Greene 172, 1853 WL 221, *2 (Iowa 1853)\b0 \i0 \ul0 (holding that a law declaring "dram shops" to be public nuisances, authorizing their abatement, and establishing certain procedures for notice and a hearing "does not deprive a person of his property without due process of law"). The notion of substantive due process survives in challenges to municipal zoning and nuisance decisions, as this court has recently held.  \b0 \i \ul0 John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 581-86 (5th Cir. 2000)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (allegation that city deprived landowners of property by allowing demolition under unconstitutionally vague ordinance states cognizable substantive due process claim).
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [**16]  Second, the plaintiffs theorize that because nuisance determinations historically involved judicial procedures, such determinations can only be "reasonable" today if they are subject to plenary court review. This theory is fundamentally at odds with the development of governmental administrative agencies. Characteristically, agency decisions are deferred to by the courts. Plaintiffs apparently seek, however, to broaden courts' involvement in nuisance decision-making contrary both to the deferential standard of judicial review of administrative decisions and to the broad standards for issuance of warrants. None of the decisions produced by plaintiffs justifies reverting to the 18th century judicial role in nuisance abatement. This court's comment in rejecting, over twenty-five years ago, a similar argument for reinstituting common law judicial review of nuisance determinations bears repeating:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    For the purposes of marking the limits of federal constitutional due process the common law of nuisance must be considered a jurisprudential artifact, interesting but not controlling.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  \b0 \i \ul0 Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156, 1159 (5th Cir. 1974)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (Goldberg,  [**17]  J.). Even more emphatically, the common law of nuisance affords no basis for creating a per se judicial warrant requirement that is redundant of procedural and substantive safeguards inherent in modern administrative law and explicit municipal nuisance ordinances.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Where history yields no firm answer, a search or seizure must be evaluated under traditional standards of reasonableness. \b0 \i \ul0 Wyoming, 526 U.S. at 300, 119 S. Ct. at 1300\b0 \i0 \ul0 . There is no Supreme Court caselaw directly on point. Still, the Court has expressed an overarching test of reasonableness that is antagonistic to an inflexible warrant requirement. Thus, the reasonableness standard is one that reflects a "'careful balancing of governmental and private interests.'" \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71, 113 S. Ct. at 549\b0 \i0 \ul0 , (quoting \b0 \i \ul0 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341, 105 S. Ct. 733, 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985))\b0 \i0 \ul0 . More recently, the Court reiterated, "as the text of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a government search is reasonableness." Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. \b0 \i \ul0 Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2390, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995). \b0 \i0 \ul0  [**18]  \fs16 \super 9\fs20 \nosupersub  Vernonia 
\sect 
\page  [*650]  also clearly distinguishes between the reasonableness of government searches and the warrant requirement:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, this Court has said that reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant. Warrants cannot be issued, of course, without the showing of probable cause required by the Warrant Clause. But a warrant is not required to establish the reasonableness of all government searches; and when a warrant is not required (and the Warrant Clause therefore not applicable), probable cause is not invariably required either. \fs16 \super 10\fs20 \nosupersub 
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  \b0 \i \ul0 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653, 115 S. Ct. at 2390-91\b0 \i0 \ul0  (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Under these decisions, the fundamental inquiry, which we will address in detail later, is the reasonableness of the City's seizure.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 9   \b0 \i \ul0 See also\b0 \i0 \ul0  \b0 \i \ul0 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447, 451 (2000)\b0 \i0 \ul0  ("The \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  requires that searches and seizures be reasonable."); \b0 \i \ul0 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1996)\b0 \i0 \ul0  ("the touchstone of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  is reasonableness") (internal quotations omitted); \b0 \i \ul0 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1776, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996)\b0 \i0 \ul0  ("It is of course true that in principle every \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  case, since it turns upon a reasonableness determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.")(quotations omitted); \b0 \i \ul0 Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967)\b0 \i0 \ul0  ("Reasonableness is still the ultimate standard under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  ."); \b0 \i \ul0 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 45 S. Ct. 280, 283, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925)\b0 \i0 \ul0  ("The \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  does not denounce all searches and seizures, but only such as are unreasonable.").
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  [**19] 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 10   The Court goes on in the same paragraph of Vernonia to state that:
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li1200\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    A search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional, we have said, 'when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable'.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  \b0 \i \ul0 515 U.S. at 653, 115 S. Ct. at 2391\b0 \i0 \ul0 . By its terms, and by the Court's further explanation, the "special needs" caveat tends to expand rather than narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement. Further, "special needs" are relevant to relaxation of the probable-cause basis for a government search for evidence. Here, however, there is probable cause for the City's seizure.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The property owners contend, however, and this court's panel opinion held that, the seizure of their property was per se unreasonable unless the City obtained a warrant to enforce its demolition order. In support of this position, plaintiffs and the panel majority rely on a handful of cases. Their reliance is misplaced.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In companion cases, the Court did extend a warrant requirement of a sort to administrative inspections of [**20]  private homes and business properties, the purpose of which was to verify compliance with municipal health and safety codes.  \b0 \i \ul0 Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; See v. \b0 \i \ul0 City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Evidence of code violations uncovered by the warrantless searches might lead to fines or other penalties. Balancing the need for searches against the property owners' privacy, the Court concluded that warrants were necessary to check the unfettered discretion \b \i0 \ul0 code enforcement\b0 \i0 \ul0  officers had in the field. A property owner had "no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization." \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 532\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Only with the protection of an administrative warrant would property owners avoid capricious or overbroad searches.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Camara and See are distinguishable from this case. First, since searches to gather evidence of regulatory [**21]  noncompliance invade citizens' privacy "without particularized suspicion of misconduct," \fs16 \super 11\fs20 \nosupersub  they need only satisfy standards of administrative reasonableness. \b0 \i \ul0 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1824, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (requiring only administrative reasonableness for regulatory searches); \b0 \i \ul0 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 n.4, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3170 n.4, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1987)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (requiring only administrative reasonableness for regulatory 
\sect 
\page  [*651]  searches). Here, the evidence of municipal code violations had already been obtained by means unchallenged by the landowners, and the administrative adjudication of noncompliance has occurred. The landowners availed themselves of two hearings resulting in a decision of the seven-member panel of the URSB, and after these proceedings, there remained a possibility of state court judicial review. What is sought by these plaintiffs is not protection against an unregulated search for evidence of wrongdoing, but additional protection to forestall the result of already-determined wrongdoing.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 11   \b0 \i \ul0 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447, 451 (2000)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [**22]  Second, the URSB, unlike the field code inspectors in Camara and See, could not operate with unbridled discretion. The municipal code specifies grounds on which a building may be determined to be a public nuisance. \fs16 \super 12\fs20 \nosupersub  The property owners' right to defend the case against their apartment buildings was procedurally secure. Only by impugning the institutional integrity of the URSB can one arrive at the conclusion, unsupported in this record, that it exercised standardless discretion and either arbitrarily enforced the municipal code or failed to consider the property owners' evidence. The nature of the URSB's adjudicative function \fs16 \super 13\fs20 \nosupersub  imposes more numerous and more transparent constraints on the URSB than did the evidence-gathering function performed by field officers randomly inspecting private buildings in Camara and See.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 12   See \b0 \i \ul0 supra\b0 \i0 \ul0  note \b0 \i \ul0 2\b0 \i0 \ul0 .
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 13   The Texas Local Government Code describes the agencies like the URSB as exercising "Quasi Judicial Enforcement of Health and Safety ordinances." Subchapter C, Texas Local Gov't. Code, Tit. 2, Subtitle D, Ch. 54 ( \'a7\'a7 54.032-54.042).
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [**23]  Third, it is hard to understand what protection the Camara-approved administrative warrant would provide for these plaintiffs. Camara relaxed the probable cause standard for issuance of such warrants, requiring only a more general determination that "legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection" be reasonable.  \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S. Ct. at 1735-36\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Camara-style administrative search warrants need not be issued by judicial officers. \b0 \i \ul0 See\b0 \i0 \ul0  \b0 \i \ul0 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and n.5, \b0 \i \ul0 97 L. Ed. 2d 709\b0 \i0 \ul0  and n.5, \b0 \i \ul0 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3170 and n.5 (1987)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Plaintiffs also admit that administrative search warrants may be issued ex parte. While the Court's standards may meaningfully constrain officials who enter private property for inspection purposes, they are obviously ill-suited to regulate completed administrative condemnation proceedings. If a warrant of some type is to be imposed in lieu of state judicial review, it must be on terms different from the Camara warrants in order to assist these landowners. But if the terms are different, then a different justification is necessary.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Camara [**24]  and See thus doubly fail to support the plaintiffs' argument. Those cases imply either that seizure of the apartment buildings was preceded by reasonable, rigorous procedures that protected the property owners' rights, or they mandate an ex parte, possibly nonjudicial administrative warrant shorn of probable cause, which does the property owners no good. While useful in their sphere, these cases fail to support a warrant following a completed nuisance abatement procedure.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The landowners have also cited Soldal in support of their warrant argument, but Soldal is not even a warrant case. The only issue decided by Soldal was whether the nonjudicial eviction-by-relocation of the tenants' mobile home, with sheriffs' deputies assisting, constituted a seizure within the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The Court refused to consider whether the seizure was constitutionally reasonable, as it stated:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    Whether the \b0 \i \ul0 4th Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  was in fact violated is, of course, a different question that requires determining if the seizure was reasonable. That inquiry 
\sect 
\page  [*652]  entails the weighing of various factors and is not before us.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal, 506 U.S. at 62, 113 S. Ct. at 543.\b0 \i0 \ul0  [**25]  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In the final case offered by plaintiffs, the Supreme Court held that the IRS must obtain a warrant to search private premises to locate property that may be seized to enforce a valid federal tax lien.  \b0 \i \ul0 GM Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S. Ct. 619, 50 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1977)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . More significantly for present purposes, the Court distinguished a search for unidentified nonexempt property from a seizure, and it rejected requiring a warrant for seizures of the taxpayer's vehicles from property where the seizures "did not involve any invasion of privacy." \b0 \i \ul0 429 U.S. at 351, 97 S. Ct. at 628\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Similarly in this case, the plaintiffs retained little or no reasonable expectation of privacy in their dilapidated, uninhabited rental properties after the URSB had entered orders declaring them an urban nuisance, and the owners had failed to abate the code violations. 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 GM Leasing also states that where seizures are sustainable under the Due Process Clause, constitutional analysis of the same acts under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  "is similar and yields a like result." \b0 \i \ul0 Id\b0 \i0 \ul0 . at n.18. Texas's administrative condemnation procedures have withstood due process challenge.  [**26]  \b0 \i \ul0 Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1974)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Far from supporting the plaintiffs, GM Leasing thus forecasts, even if it does not compel, that a balancing of the public and private interests at stake will favor the public interest in nuisance abatement after the conclusion of adequate administrative proceedings.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Not only does plaintiffs' theory lack support in Supreme Court caselaw, but it enjoys only minority support among the federal circuits. The Eighth and Sixth Circuits have found no \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  bar to warrantless condemnation and eviction proceedings, where satisfactory administrative procedures preceded them.  \b0 \i \ul0 Samuels v. Meriwether, 94 F.3d 1163 (8th Cir. 1996)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Hroch v. City of Omaha, 4 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 1993)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Flatford v. City of Monroe, 17 F.3d 162, 170 (6th Cir. 1994)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . On the other hand, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held that a warrant was necessary before city officials could enter private property to seize previously-condemned automobiles.  \b0 \i \ul0 Conner v. City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487, 1495 (9th Cir. 1990)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . We disagree with Conner for reasons stated in Judge [**27]  Trott's dissent, \b0 \i \ul0 897 F.2d at 1494-98\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and based on our evaluation of \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  reasonableness. 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Although the City did not have to obtain a warrant to effectuate a valid seizure and demolition of the nuisance structures, the fundamental \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  question of reasonableness remains, a question decided by balancing the public and private interests at stake.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, "the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated." \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 537, 87 S. Ct. 1735\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Regulation of nuisance properties is at the heart of the municipal police power. \fs16 \super 14\fs20 \nosupersub  It is eminently reasonable for a city to prescribe minimum property maintenance standards to protect the public and to maintain adjacent land values. Nevertheless, a city may not arbitrarily enter abatement orders or declare the existence of nuisances with no underlying 
\sect 
\page  [*653]  standards. Texas law forbids such actions, \fs16 \super 15\fs20 \nosupersub  and the City's ordinance exemplifies the state statutes' criteria. Contrary to the landowners' argument, Dallas's minimum standards for property owners assure structural soundness, public health and safety and human habitability.  [**28]  The Dallas ordinance is not concerned with aesthetic or non-functional values. The ordinance falls well within the City's police power and thus within a sphere that courts have traditionally been reluctant to invade.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 14   While the Supreme Court has not specifically defined the scope of the police power, it has reaffirmed the "classic statement" of the rule:
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li1200\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    'To justify the State in . . . interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public . . . require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.' Even this rule is not applied with strict precision, for this Court has often said that 'debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the legislature. . . .'
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \b0 \i \ul0 \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95, 82 S. Ct. 987, 990, 8 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1962)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (citations omitted).
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 15   \b0 \i \ul0 See generally\b0 \i0 \ul0 , Tex. Loc. Govt. Code, Tit. 2, Subtitle D, ch. 54.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [**29]  Prescription of standards necessitates their enforcement, and it is also reasonable that nuisance abatement be one of the enforcement mechanisms available to the City. While abatement is permissible, however, the City ordinance affords property owners the opportunity to contest the determination of non-compliance, to repair their property, or to seek other remedies. Dallas's procedures include reasonable notice to and time limits upon landowners' actions, multiple hearing possibilities, flexible remedies, and judicial review in state court under typical criteria for review of administrative actions. \fs16 \super 16\fs20 \nosupersub  That these standards comport with due process suggests the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  reasonableness of the URSB's final remedial orders.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 16   Indeed, the grounds for state court judicial review are nearly identical to those standards employed historically by courts in reviewing nuisance decisions, \b0 \i \ul0 i.e.\b0 \i0 \ul0  the decisions on which plaintiffs seek to build the edifice of their warrant requirement.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 With regard to the landowners' [**30]  interests, the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  protects only those expectations of privacy that society recognizes as "legitimate".  \b0 \i \ul0 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338, 105 S. Ct. 733, 741, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1984)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . What expectations are legitimate varies, of course, with context . . .  and . . . may depend upon the individual's legal relationship with the State".  \b0 \i \ul0 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654, 115 S. Ct. at 2391\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Because the Dallas nuisance standards are straightforward and the administrative procedure is adequate, these property owners' expectation of privacy in the nuisance structures after the remedial orders became final was severely diminished. As vacant commercial properties, the structures were not subject to the same degree of privacy protection as non-business property.  \b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2642, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1987)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1501, 94 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1987)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Further, nearly a year had passed since the plaintiffs were informed of their structures' non-compliance. While they did defend themselves before the URSB, they made no significant [**31]  progress in remedying violations whose total repair cost was nearly $ 200,000. Whereas the landowners in Soldal were the victims of non-judicial eviction without prior notice, these plaintiffs had ample notice and a full panoply of administrative remedies. Finally, since the rent properties were uninhabited, the demolition, unlike the eviction carried out in Soldal, did not invade anyone's personal privacy.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Requiring an administrative warrant of some sort after the URSB proceedings would not have enhanced the landowners' security or privacy. A Camara warrant could be sought \b0 \i \ul0 ex parte\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; it could be obtained solely on the basis of the completed administrative record; no requirements of pre- or post-warrant notification of the City's intended actions were necessary. If the purpose of a warrant is to obtain some neutral review of the URSB orders, this procedure is less protective of the landowners than existing judicial review in state court. 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The ultimate test of reasonableness is fulfilled in this case by the City's adherence to its ordinances and procedures as a prelude to ordering the landowners to abate their nuisance structures. \fs16 \super 17\fs20 \nosupersub  
\sect 
\page  [*654]  The Supreme Court originally extended [**32]  an administrative warrant requirement to civil investigations because "the basic purpose of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  . . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 528, 87 S. Ct. at 1730\b0 \i0 \ul0  (emphasis added); \b0 \i \ul0 see also\b0 \i0 \ul0  \b0 \i \ul0 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 312, 98 S. Ct. at 1820\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Whatever else the City's enforcement of its municipal habitation code might be, it is sufficiently hedged about by published standards, quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, and flexible remedies that it is not arbitrary. In the context of reviewing civil administrative and regulatory enforcement of laws enacted pursuant to the traditional police power, \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  reasonableness means non-arbitrariness. The \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  was not violated here. \fs16 \super 18\fs20 \nosupersub 
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 17   In reaching this conclusion, we do not ignore Soldal's mandate that a particular government action may implicate more than one constitutional provision.  \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal, 506 U.S. at 70, 113 S. Ct. at 538\b0 \i0 \ul0 . A particular nuisance determination might be reviewable under the \b0 \i \ul0 Takings Clause\b0 \i0 \ul0  or Substantive Due Process as well as the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  or Procedural Due Process standards.  \b0 \i \ul0 John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2000)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . But the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  reasonableness of a seizure and demolition of nuisance property will ordinarily be established when the substantive and procedural safeguards inherent in state and municipal property standards ordinances have been fulfilled. \b0 \i \ul0 See\b0 \i0 \ul0  \b0 \i \ul0 Samuels, 94 F.3d at 1168\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  [**33] 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 18   \b0 \i \ul0 Cf.\b0 \i0 \ul0  \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71, 113 S. Ct. at 549\b0 \i0 \ul0  ("Assuming . . . that the evicting officers were acting pursuant to a court order . . . a showing of unreasonableness would be a laborious task indeed."). Likewise, we believe a showing of unreasonableness in the face of the City's adherence to its ordinance is a "laborious task indeed."
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 CONCLUSION\b0 \i0 \ul0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 For all these reasons, we conclude that the seizure and demolition of the plaintiffs' apartment buildings, after those structures were condemned according to City ordinance and state law, were reasonable under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The judgment against the City is \b \i0 \ul0 REVERSED\b0 \i0 \ul0 .  
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 DISSENT BY: \b0 \i0 \ul0 DENNIS 
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 DISSENT
\par \b0 \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 DENNIS, Circuit Judge, with whom WIENER, BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges, join in Part I only, dissenting:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The en banc majority reaches the conclusion that, while binding Supreme Court precedent interpreting the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment's\b0 \i0 \ul0  proscription of unreasonable searches would clearly require the URSB to secure a warrant from a neutral judicial officer to conduct an inspection of the two apartment buildings in the absence [**34]  of consent or exigent circumstances, the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment's\b0 \i0 \ul0  proscription of unreasonable seizures, as illumined by the same and additional Supreme Court precedent, does not require the URSB to secure such a warrant before demolishing the same apartment buildings. Unable to square this anomalous result with the language of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  or Supreme Court jurisprudence, I dissent.
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 I. \b \i \ul0 FOURTH AMENDMENT\b \i0 \ul0 \b0 \i0 \ul0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 A. \b \i0 \ul0 Camara, Soldal, and Freeman\b0 \i0 \ul0 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The Freeman panel majority holding that the URSB violated the owners' \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  rights correctly follows the Supreme Court's \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  decisions in \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and \b0 \i \ul0 Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In \b0 \i \ul0 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 3 L. Ed. 2d 877, 79 S. Ct. 804 (1959)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (5-4 decision), overruled by  \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 523 (1967)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the Court upheld, by a five-to-four vote, a state court conviction of a homeowner who refused to permit a municipal health inspector to enter and inspect his premises without a search [**35]  warrant. In his majority opinion, Justice Frankfurter suggested that the individual  [*655]  and his private property are fully protected by the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior, and that a warrant is not required for an administrative inspection because the "power to inspect dwellings to maintain community health would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts." \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 372\b0 \i0 \ul0 .
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 534\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the Court expressly overruled Frank v. Maryland, holding that under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  a lessee of the ground floor of an apartment building had a constitutional right to insist that San Francisco Department of Public Health Housing Code inspectors obtain a judicial warrant to inspect his premises, and that he could not be constitutionally convicted for refusal to consent to the inspection. The Dallas URSB advances the same "public necessity" arguments in support of warrantless, non-exigent seizures and destruction of private property that the Court firmly rejected as insufficient to uphold San Francisco's warrantless, non-exigent housing code inspections [**36]  in Camara. San Francisco argued that (i) the ordinances authorizing inspections are hedged with safeguards and the inspector's decision to enter must comply with the standard of reasonableness even if he may enter without a warrant, \b0 \i \ul0 id. at 531\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; (ii) the warrant process could not function effectively in this field, \b0 \i \ul0 id. at 532\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; and (iii) the public interest demands warrantless administrative searches as the only effective means of enforcing minimum fire, housing, and sanitation standards, \b0 \i \ul0 id. at 533\b0 \i0 \ul0 . As Justice White, writing for the Camara majority, explained:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    In our opinion, these arguments unduly discount the purposes behind the warrant machinery contemplated by the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Under the present system, when the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization. These are questions which may be reviewed by a neutral magistrate without any reassessment of the [**37]  basic agency decision to canvass an area. . . . We simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb120 \fi360 . . . It has nowhere been urged that fire, health, and housing code inspection programs could not achieve their goals within the confines of a reasonable warrant requirement. Thus, we do not find the public need argument dispositive.
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb120 \fi360 In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. State of Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment's\b0 \i0 \ul0  protections.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 532-34\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Thus, Camara held that, in the absence of consent or an emergency [**38]  situation, the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  requires that a warrant be issued by a judicial officer before a government entity may inspect private property to enforce minimum health and safety standards for the prevention of "fires and epidemics" or "unsightly conditions adversely affecting the economic  [*656]  values of neighboring structures." \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 534, 535\b0 \i0 \ul0 , & 539-40. 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In the second part of its opinion, the Court in Camara discussed the type of "probable cause" required for a warrant to enter and inspect private property. The Court concluded that "'a health official need not show the same kind of proof to a magistrate as one must who would search for the fruits or instrumentalities of crime.'" \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 538\b0 \i0 \ul0  (quoting \b0 \i \ul0 Frank, 359 U.S. at 383\b0 \i0 \ul0 ) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Instead, the satisfaction of reasonable legislative or administrative standards for inspections may be used to show "probable cause," such as the passage of time, the nature of the buildings, the condition of the entire area, or other factors not necessarily dependent upon specific knowledge of the condition of a particular dwelling. See id. "Reasonableness is still the ultimate [**39]  standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted warrant." \b0 \i \ul0 387 U.S. at 539\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \fs16 \super 19\fs20 \nosupersub 
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 19   In See v. \b0 \i \ul0 City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, 87 S. Ct. 1737 (1967)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , decided the same day as Camara, the Court held that the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  forbids warrantless inspections of commercial structures as well as private residences. "The basic component of a reasonable search under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 -that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant procedure-is applicable in this context, as in others, to business as well as to residential premises." \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 546\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal, 506 U.S. at 61\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the Court held that the presence of deputy sheriffs for the purpose of forestalling the Soldal family's resistance while a trailer park operator seized and removed the family's house trailer from the park, without a warrant, eviction judgment, other judicial order, or exigent circumstances, [**40]  clearly implicated the Soldals' \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  rights. In an unanimous opinion by Justice White, the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's narrow reading of the Amendment, which the Circuit construed as safeguarding only privacy and liberty interests while leaving unprotected possessory interests when neither privacy nor liberty is at stake.  \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 62\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The Court held that "the Amendment protects the people from unreasonable searches and seizures of 'their persons, houses, papers, and effects.' This language surely cuts against the novel holding below, and our cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property as well as privacy." Id. The Court pointed to its decisions explaining that a "seizure" of property occurs when "'there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property,'" \b0 \i \ul0 id. at 61\b0 \i0 \ul0  (quoting \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984))\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and concluded: "We fail to see how being unceremoniously dispossessed of one's home in the manner alleged to have occurred here can be viewed as anything but a seizure invoking the protection of the [**41]  \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 ." Id.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The Court in Soldal stopped short of deciding whether the seizure was a violation of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  because the Seventh Circuit had failed to reach that issue due to its incorrect decision that there had been no "seizure." A careful reading of the Court's unanimous Soldal opinion, however, strongly suggests that a violation had occurred under \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  law because (1) the dispossession of the Soldals of their trailer home was a "seizure" because it was a "meaningful interference" with their possessory interest, \b0 \i \ul0 506 U.S. at 61\b0 \i0 \ul0 , not an insignificant interference associated with a "garden-variety" landlord-tenant or commercial dispute, \b0 \i \ul0 id. at 72\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; (2) the deputies were acting under color of state law in assisting in the seizure, \b0 \i \ul0 id. at 60 n.6\b0 \i0 \ul0  & 71; (3) the officers were not acting pursuant to a warrant or other judicial order, \b0 \i \ul0 id. at 58\b0 \i0 \ul0  and 71; (4) there was no probable cause to associate the seized property with criminal activity, \b0 \i \ul0 id. at 68\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; and (5) there was no emergency situation because  [*657]  the seizure could have "properly awaited the state court's judgment," \b0 \i \ul0 id. at 71\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The Court noted that the Seventh Circuit had correctly [**42]  acknowledged that, under the Supreme Court's precedents, the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment's\b0 \i0 \ul0  protection applies in the civil as well as the criminal context.  \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 67\b0 \i0 \ul0 . But the Supreme Court concluded that the Circuit had erred when it seemingly construed the Amendment to protect only against seizures that are the outcome of a search.  \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 68\b0 \i0 \ul0 . "Our cases are to the contrary and hold that seizures of property are subject to \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the Amendment has taken place." Id. The Supreme Court explained that the Seventh Circuit's construction of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  to protect only against seizures that are the outcome of a search is at odds with the Supreme Court's plain-view cases in which seizures of property are subject to \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the Amendment has taken place.  \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 68\b0 \i0 \ul0  (citing \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120-25\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588-89, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325, 94 S. Ct. 2464 (1974))\b0 \i0 \ul0 . "For the plain-view [**43]  cases clearly state that, notwithstanding the absence of any interference with privacy, seizures of effects that are not authorized by warrant are reasonable only because there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity." \b0 \i \ul0 506 U.S. at 69\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Significantly, the Court also made it clear that the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  protections are triggered when a government entity seizes a building to enforce compliance with housing regulations, stating:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    In our view, the reason why an officer might enter a house or effectuate a seizure is wholly irrelevant to the threshold question whether the Amendment applies. What matters is the intrusion on the people's security from governmental interference. Therefore, the right against unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the seizure of the house was undertaken to collect evidence, verify compliance with a housing regulation, effect an eviction by the police, or on a whim, for no reason at all. As we have observed on more than one occasion, it would be "anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."  [**44]  
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 69\b0 \i0 \ul0  (quoting \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 530\b0 \i0 \ul0 ). \fs16 \super 20\fs20 \nosupersub 
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 20   See also  \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125 n.28\b0 \i0 \ul0  (relied on prominently in Soldal, in which the Court issued the following caveat: "Of course, where more substantial invasions than taking a trace of powder for a chemical test of constitutionally protected interests are involved, a warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances." (citing \b0 \i \ul0 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977)))\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Finally, the Court in Soldal characterized as "exaggerated" the fears of the Seventh Circuit and Cook County that applying the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  [**45]  in this context will federalize areas of law traditionally the concern of the states, such as routine repossessions, negligent actions of public employees that interfere with individuals' right to enjoy their homes, and the like.  \b0 \i \ul0 506 U.S. at 71\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The Court's opinion expressly or impliedly indicates several reasons for this conclusion: (1) activities by state actors such as repossessions or attachments that involve entry into the home, intrusion on individuals' privacy, or interference with their liberty, have long been recognized as implicating \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  rights; (2) if the state action does not involve privacy or liberty interests, "'reasonableness is still the ultimate  [*658]  standard . If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. '" Id. (quoting \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 539\b0 \i0 \ul0 ) (bracketed material added. See \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 539\b0 \i0 \ul0 ). Thus, generally speaking, a state officer will not violate the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  when his acts under color of law are (a) pursuant to a warrant or other judicial or court order, see id.; (b) in emergency situations,  [**46]  see \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 539\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; or (c) insignificant interferences associated with "garden variety" commercial or landlord-tenant disputes, \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal, 506 U.S. at 72\b0 \i0 \ul0 , rather than "some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in . . . property." \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 61\b0 \i0 \ul0  (quoting \b0 \i \ul0 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113\b0 \i0 \ul0 ). For these reasons, it is evident that, if the Court in Soldal had been required to reach the issue, it would have concluded that the seizure in which the Soldals were "unceremoniously dispossessed" of their trailer home, without a warrant, eviction judgment, or other judicial order, and in the absence of any emergency, was a violation of the Soldals' \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  rights. \fs16 \super 21\fs20 \nosupersub 
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 21   On remand, in light of the Supreme Court's decision, the district court concluded that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. "Because we determine that plaintiffs' allegations support an inference that the defendants were aware of circumstances making their actions unreasonable, and hence, illegal, we refuse to dismiss the action." \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal v. County of Cook, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8058, *10, No. 88 C7654, 1993 WL 199050, *5 n.1 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 1993)\b0 \i0 \ul0 .
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [**47]  Correspondingly, the Dallas URSB's seizure and destruction of the private property owners' edifices were "meaningful interferences" with their possessory interests in their buildings, not a "garden-variety" commercial or landlord-tenant controversy. On the contrary, it was a seizure and destruction of private property that was at least as invasive as the removal of a house trailer from a trailer park or the seizure of a building "undertaken to collect evidence, verify compliance with a housing regulation, effect an eviction by the police, or on a whim, for no reason at all." \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal, 506 U.S. at 69\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Consequently, the administrative seizures and demolitions by the URSB at issue in the present case were significant intrusions upon the interests of private property owners protected by the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and such seizures and demolitions by the URSB, a government entity acting under color of state law, not pursuant to a judicial warrant or court order, and not in an emergency situation, are clear violations of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth\b0 \i0 \ul0  and \b0 \i \ul0 Fourteenth Amendments\b0 \i0 \ul0 . See \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 534\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal, 506 U.S. at 66-67\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 B. This Court Is Bound  \b0 \i0 \ul0 [**48]\b \i0 \ul0   By Camara and See, Not Frank v. Maryland\b0 \i0 \ul0 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 A Federal Court of Appeals is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, even if the intermediate appellate judges think that a Supreme Court decision is unsound or in error. See  \b0 \i \ul0 Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 260, 103 S. Ct. 1343 (1983)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375, 70 L. Ed. 2d 556, 102 S. Ct. 703 (1982)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1983)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (citing and quoting \b0 \i \ul0 Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir. 1964)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , overruled in part on other grounds by  \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (1967))\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Twin City Power Co. of Georgia, 253 F.2d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 1958)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Marcello v. Ahrens, 212 F.2d 830, 839 (5th Cir. 1954)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , aff'd, \b0 \i \ul0 349 U.S. 302 (1955)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Accordingly, this court must follow Camara and See, which held that, because of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , administrative entry or invasion of private residential or commercial property, without consent [**49]  or an emergency situation, may only be compelled within the framework of a suitable judicial warrant procedure.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [*659]  Nevertheless, the majority concludes that the district court and the panel \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  majority were wrong in holding that the URSB violated the building owners' \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  rights by seizing and destroying their private property without consent or a warrant and in the absence of exigent circumstances. This conclusion is based on a common theme, (i) that the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  does not require a judicial warrant procedure to protect individuals from meaningful interferences with their possessory interests in private property by governmental entities; (ii) instead, the Amendment only protects such individuals by the deterrent effects of reparations under \b0 \i \ul0 \'a7 1983\b0 \i0 \ul0  if it is determined ex post facto that private property was seized or destroyed "unreasonably" according to a standard of reasonableness or a balancing of private and public interests. In effect, the majority seems to think that the warrant requirements of Camara and See have been overruled and Frank v. Maryland's warrantless standard of reasonableness has been resurrected in their place.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Similarly,  [**50]  the majority's reasoning erroneously suggests that Justice White's references in part III of \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal to Camara and New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , somehow signal approval of warrantless seizures of private property, without consent or exigent circumstances, by officers acting under color of law, so long as the officers comply with a standard of reasonableness reflecting a careful balancing of public and private interests. The passage containing those references, part of Justice White's explanation that Soldal's interpretation of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  involves little or no risk of federalizing state law, states:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    More significantly, "reasonableness is still the ultimate standard" under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, supra, 387 U.S. at 539, 87 S. Ct. at 1736\b0 \i0 \ul0 , which means that numerous seizures of this type will survive constitutional scrutiny. As is true in other circumstances, the reasonableness determination will reflect a "careful balancing of governmental and private interests." \b0 \i \ul0 T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S. Ct. at 742\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Assuming, for example, that [**51]  the officers were acting pursuant to a court order, as in \b0 \i \ul0 Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516 (CA10 1987)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , or \b0 \i \ul0 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and as often would be the case, a showing of unreasonableness on these facts would be a laborious task indeed. Cf.  \b0 \i \ul0 Simms v. Slacum, 7 U.S. 300, 3 Cranch 300, 301, 2 L. Ed. 446 (1806)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Hence, while there is no guarantee against the filing of frivolous suits, had the ejection in this case properly awaited the state court's judgment it is quite unlikely that the federal court would have been bothered with a \b0 \i \ul0 \'a7 1983\b0 \i0 \ul0  action alleging a \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  violation.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 A careful reading of the complete passages from which Justice White quoted in the forgoing paragraph shows that he, as the author of Camara, T.L.O., and Soldal, did not in any of those passages suggest dispensing with the warrant procedure. To the contrary, he consistently repeated the idea he expressed for the Court in Camara,"that a health official need not show the same kind of proof to a magistrate to obtain a warrant as one must [**52]  who would search for the fruits or instrumentalities of crime." \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 538\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Later in Camara, in the passage partially quoted in Soldal, Justice White stated: "The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant." \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 539\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The same day in See, he expressed these ideas in a different way:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb120 \fi360  [*660]  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb120 \fi360 The agency's particular demand for access will of course be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved. But the decision to enter and inspect will not be the product of the unreviewed discretion of the enforcement officer in the field.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 See, \b0 \i \ul0 387 U.S. at 545\b0 \i0 \ul0  (footnote omitted). His full sentence describing the flexible probable cause concept in T.L.O., reads: "Where a [**53]  careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard." \b0 \i \ul0 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Justice White also wrote for the Supreme Court in \b0 \i \ul0 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , which held that, under the warrant clause of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) is unconstitutional to the extent that it would permit inspections of private businesses by OSHA inspectors without a warrant or its equivalent. He began by reaffirming that "the Warrant Clause of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  protects commercial buildings as well as private homes", \b0 \i \ul0 id. at 311\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and that, accordingly, "warrantless searches are generally unreasonable, and that this rule applies to commercial premises as well as homes." \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 312\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Justice White then discussed Camara and See, and then concluded "that unless some recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies, See v. City of Seattle would [**54]  require a warrant to conduct the inspection sought in this case." \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 313\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Because of the absence of a recognized exception to the warrant requirement - such as pervasively regulated businesses in which entrepreneurs voluntarily choose to subject themselves to the full arsenal of governmental regulation thereby precluding a reasonable expectation of privacy (which is clearly the exception and not the rule) - without a warrant a government inspector "stands in no better position than a member of the public." \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 313-15\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Most important, in Marshall, Justice White expressly rejected the Secretary of Labor's argument that "the enforcement scheme of the Act requires warrantless searches, and that the restrictions on search discretion contained in the Act and in its regulations already protect as much privacy as a warrant would." \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 315\b0 \i0 \ul0 . These are precisely the arguments advanced by the City of Dallas and accepted by the majority in this case. In fact, as the following passage aptly demonstrates, these arguments take out of context Soldal's quotation from Camara ("reasonableness is still the ultimate standard") and [**55]  attribute to it a meaning explicitly rejected by Justice White:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    The Secretary thereby asserts the actual reasonableness of OSHA searches, whatever the general rule against warrantless searches might be. Because "reasonableness is still the ultimate standard," \b0 \i \ul0 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 539, 87 S. Ct. at 1736\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the Secretary suggests that the Court decide whether a warrant is needed by arriving at a sensible balance between the administrative necessities of OSHA inspections and the incremental protection of privacy of business owners a warrant would afford. He suggests that only a decision exempting OSHA inspections from the warrant clause would give "full recognition to the competing public and private interests here at stake." Ibid.
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb120 \fi360 . . . .
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb120 \fi360 We are unconvinced, however, that requiring warrants to inspect will impose serious burdens on the inspection system or the courts, will prevent inspections  [*661]  necessary to enforce the statute, or will make them less effective. . . .
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  \b0 \i \ul0 436 U.S. at 315-16\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Moreover, Justice White makes crystal clear that "reasonableness" afforded by the statutory scheme may substitute for probable cause to issue the warrant,  [**56]  but it may not substitute for the warrant itself:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    Whether the Secretary proceeds to secure a warrant or other process, with or without prior notice, his entitlement to inspect will not depend on his demonstrating probable cause to believe that conditions in violation of OSHA exist on the premises. Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For purposes of an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular establishment ." \b0 \i \ul0 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S. Ct. at 1736\b0 \i0 \ul0 . . . . We doubt that the consumption of enforcement energies in the obtaining of such warrants will exceed manageable proportions.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  \b0 \i \ul0 436 U.S. at 320-21\b0 \i0 \ul0  (footnote omitted)(bracketed text in original).
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Finally, Justice White rejected the notion "that the incremental protections afforded the employer's privacy by a warrant are so marginal that they fail to justify the administrative burdens that may [**57]  be entailed." \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 322\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    The authority to make warrantless searches devolves almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to search. A warrant, by contrast, would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 323\b0 \i0 \ul0  (footnote omitted).
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Against this background, it is clear that Justice White in the Soldal paragraph quoting parts of the Camara and T.L.O. passages did not impliedly or silently overrule the principal holding of Camara that significant administrative intrusions require a warrant procedure, in the absence of consent or an emergency. \fs16 \super 22\fs20 \nosupersub  Read within the context of the passages from Camara, See, Marshall, and T.L.O., describing the flexible standard of reasonableness, it is clear that in that Soldal paragraph Justice White merely expressed the opinion that it will be difficult to show a \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  violation when an officer seizes property pursuant to a court order,  [**58]  if the order was measured and issued according to a reasonable standard based on a careful balancing of public and private interests. This meaning is borne out by the citation in the Soldal paragraph calling upon the reader to reference \b0 \i \ul0 Simms v. Slacum, 3 Cranch 300, 301, 7 U.S. 300, 306-07, 2 L. Ed. 446 (1806)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , in which Chief Justice Marshall stated:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    The judgments of a court of competent jurisdiction, although obtained by fraud, have never been considered as absolutely void; and, therefore, all acts performed under them are valid so far as respects third persons. A sheriff who levies an execution under a judgment fraudulently obtained, is not a trespasser, nor can the person who purchases at a sale under such an execution, be compelled  [*662]  to relinquish the property he has purchased.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  \b0 \i \ul0 7 U.S. at 306-07\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 22   
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \pard \qj \li1200\ri600 \sb0 \fi0    In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  protections.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0  
\par \b0 \i \ul0 \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 534\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [**59]  In short, Camara, See, Marshall, T.L.O., and Soldal all indicate that under certain circumstances a flexible standard of reasonableness can substitute for the kind of probable cause that must be shown by law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant to search for criminal evidence; they do not support the notion that reasonableness can substitute for the judicial warrant that is required before an administrative search or seizure of private property without consent or an emergency situation.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 This court cannot legitimately overrule or disregard Camara and See, which require a warrant before a municipality can effect a search or seizure of private residential or commercial property without consent or emergency circumstances under health, safety, and building regulations, even if a flexible probable cause or reasonableness standard has been met.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The language upon which the majority relies in arguing that Camara and See are inapplicable is taken out of context from the "special, beyond normal, law enforcement needs" cases that are inapposite here. The cases the majority cites--Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton (suspicionless random drug testing of [**60]  high school athletes in a particular exigent factual situation); Griffin v. Wisconsin (reasonable grounds search without a warrant of probationer within legal custody under state law pursuant to a state regulation authorizing such warrantless searches); New Jersey v. T.L.O. (search of student's purse on suspicion of violation of school rule against smoking)--are those in which the Court has "permitted exceptions when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.'" \b0 \i \ul0 Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (citing \b0 \i \ul0 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987))\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The Court in those cases clearly limited the "special needs" exception to the warrant requirement to special situations in criminal law enforcement: "A State's operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause [**61]  requirements." \b0 \i \ul0 Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; see also  \b0 \i \ul0 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 137 L. Ed. 2d 513, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (Georgia's requirement that candidates for state office pass drug test did not fit within closely guarded special needs category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches ); \b0 \i \ul0 United Teachers of New Orleans v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 142 F.3d 853 (5th Cir. 1998)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (school board's rules violated \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  inasmuch as no special needs exception to requirement of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing applied).
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The present case is not a criminal law enforcement case, much less a "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement" case, and it is certainly not a case in which the warrant requirement is impracticable. The majority's rejection of the warrant requirement in this case makes it difficult to say that it exists at all in the Fifth Circuit, except for few persons whose criminal convictions are reversed because the violation of their \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  rights was so flagrant as to amount to harmful, reversible error.
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 C. This Circuit and Others\b0 \i0 \ul0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In concluding that the URSB [**62]  violated the owners' \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  rights, the Freeman panel \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  majority decision followed the controlling precedent of this Circuit, and this decision does not conflict with what is the controlling precedents of other circuits.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1021 (5th Cir. 1998)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , this court recognized  [*663]  that "the Supreme Court recently made clear that the protection afforded by the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  extends to an individual's possessory interests in property, even if his expectation of privacy in that property has been completely extinguished." (citing \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal, 506 U.S. at 62-63\b0 \i0 \ul0 ). This court in Paige also observed that "generally, 'seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 -subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.'" \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 1022\b0 \i0 \ul0  (quoting \b0 \i \ul0 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993))\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The Freeman \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  majority applied Paige's teachings from the Supreme Court cases of \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 104 S. Ct. 1652,\b0 \i0 \ul0  [**63]  and \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 103 S. Ct. 2637\b0 \i0 \ul0 , to conclude that the URSB seizures do not fall within an exception to the warrant requirement fashioned in those cases because the seizures were not lawful and temporary in their inception, the seizures did not have a de minimis impact on the owners' property interests, and it could not be said that the safeguards of a warrant would have only minimally advanced \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  interests.  \b0 \i \ul0 Freeman v. City of Dallas, 186 F.3d 601, 606 (5th Cir. 1999)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The Freeman \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  majority is not inconsistent with the other Circuits' leading cases although it is at odds with an Eighth Circuit case. In \b0 \i \ul0 Flatford v. City of Monroe, 17 F.3d 162, 170 (6th Cir. 1994)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the Sixth Circuit held that under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  the plaintiffs "were entitled to pre-eviction judicial oversight in the absence of emergency circumstances." That court also found that the eviction had been predicated upon exigent circumstances. \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 170-71\b0 \i0 \ul0 . In \b0 \i \ul0 Hroch v. City of Omaha, 4 F.3d 693, 697 (8th Cir. 1993)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the Eighth Circuit held that the defendants'  [**64]  actions in implementing the City's condemnation order did not constitute an unreasonable seizure in violation of Hroch's \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  rights. The Hroch court pointed out that a state court had denied an injunction so that there was judicial oversight of the condemnation process which provided "a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant." \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 696-97\b0 \i0 \ul0  (citing and quoting \b0 \i \ul0 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262, 101 S. Ct. 2534 (1981))\b0 \i0 \ul0 . In \b0 \i \ul0 Conner v. City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487, 1492 (9th Cir. 1990)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the Ninth Circuit held that a search and seizure of the Conners' property to abate a known nuisance without any judicial authorization was impermissible under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Although Conner was decided before Soldal, it is consistent with that decision because it relied on Camara, and Soldal did not change Camara; rather, Soldal only reaffirmed what had been established before, that the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  protects property as well as privacy and may protect property interests even when neither privacy nor liberty is at stake.  \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal, 506 U.S. at 62-71\b0 \i0 \ul0 . In [**65]  \b0 \i \ul0 Samuels v. Meriwether, 94 F.3d 1163, 1167-68 (8th Cir. 1996)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , however, the Eight Circuit misread Soldal as overruling Camara sub silentio and replacing the warrant process required by Camara with a reasonableness balancing test. Soldal does not express or imply such an intention, however, and it is absurd to attribute to Justice White, the author of both opinions, an intention to overrule Camara without saying so, particularly since he cites and quotes Camara prominently with approval in Soldal. 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 All of these circuit decisions, except Samuels v. Meriwether, are consistent with a correct reading of Camara, See, and Soldal which plainly indicate that, in the context of administrative searches and seizures, compliance with reasonable legislative and administrative standards may serve as probable cause for a warrant, but not as a substitute for the warrant procedure itself; see  \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 538, 545-46\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; although nothing forecloses  [*664]  prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations. See  \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. \b0 \i0 \ul0  [**66]  
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 D. Other Arguments\b0 \i0 \ul0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 A number of rationales are advanced by the majority that have a false appearance of genuineness, but are really only variations on their main theme of contention:
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 (1) That only self-imposed reasonableness is required of a governmental entity in seizing and razing buildings for urban renewal, and the municipal procedures followed by the URSB assured sufficient reasonableness in this case. This argument is premised upon two faulty propositions: (i) that \b0 \i \ul0 Fourteenth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  due process of law and \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  reasonableness analyses are fungible; and (ii) that Soldal sub silentio overruled Camara and its warrant requirement for administrative searches and seizures, thereby resurrecting Frank v. Maryland and its warrantless reasonableness standard. With respect to (i), in Soldal, the Supreme Court expressly rejected that proposition, stating that "certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution's commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged . . . we examine each constitutional provision in turn." \b0 \i \ul0 506 U.S. at 70\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; see also  \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 49-50, 126 L. Ed. 2d 490, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) \b0 \i0 \ul0  [**67]  (in considering claims that the same government conduct violated both the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  protections against unreasonable seizure and the \b0 \i \ul0 Fifth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  protections of due process of law, the Court stated that it has repeatedly rejected the view that the applicability of one constitutional amendment preempts the guarantees of another).  \b0 \i \ul0 Flatford, 17 F.3d at 170-71\b0 \i0 \ul0 , does not support the argument either, because it, in effect, merely concludes that both the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  and Due Process standards are relaxed where the conduct complained of is justified by exigent circumstances. With respect to (ii), as demonstrated earlier, Soldal, a unanimous opinion by Justice White, building on and citing with approval his own opinion for the court in Camara, cannot reasonably be read to implicitly or silently overrule Camara's core holding that, in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances, administrative searches or seizures of private houses or buildings without a judicial warrant violate the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and that Frank v. Maryland is expressly overruled. 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 (2) That the URSB is the functional equivalent of a neutral and detached judicial officer.  [**68]  The fallacy of this contention is self-evident. The URSB is an agency of the City of Dallas charged with the remediation - including the demolition--of structures deemed by it to constitute urban nuisances. The URSB's job is to eliminate unsightly conditions adversely affecting the economic value of neighboring property and the City's tax base. The URSB cannot possibly serve effectively in this executive capacity and act as a neutral and detached magistrate to safeguard the rights of the owners whose buildings it determines should be razed. "When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 529\b0 \i0 \ul0  (citing and quoting \b0 \i \ul0 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 92 L. Ed. 436, 68 S. Ct. 367 (1948))\b0 \i0 \ul0 . This principle applies with equal force to the seizure and destruction of real property by government enforcement agencies such as the URSB, because the decision to seize and destroy private property under these circumstances, like the decision to enter and inspect, "cannot be the product of unreviewed discretion of [**69]  the enforcement officer in the field." \b0 \i \ul0 387 U.S. at 532\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Rather, the "warrant machinery contemplated by the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 " so prominently emphasized by Justice White is necessarily administered by a  [*665]  "neutral magistrate." See  \b0 \i \ul0 Camara, 387 U.S. at 532\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 323\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 (3) That the warrant process would overburden the URSB. This argument was rejected firmly by the Supreme Court in Camara, see \b0 \i \ul0 387 U.S. at 532\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and again in \b0 \i \ul0 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 321\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Moreover, the step of securing a warrant issued by a neutral and detached judicial officer is not difficult or time consuming. The property owner benefits greatly from the safeguarding of his protected interests that can only be provided by a neutral judicial officer's pre-execution approval of the seizure and demolition. In the present case, as is typical, almost a year passed between the notices of noncompliance and the ultimate demolition orders. Had the URSB at the appropriate time during this lengthy period properly obtained a warrant for the seizure and demolition of the owners' buildings, it is almost certain that the federal court would not have been [**70]  bothered with this \b0 \i \ul0 \'a7 1983\b0 \i0 \ul0  action alleging a \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  violation.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 (4) That Texas currently has no procedural mechanism for judicial oversight of public nuisance abatement. However, it appears that such oversight is provided for by Texas legislated law. See Tex. Gov't. Code Ann. \'a7\'a7 24.08 (district court may hear and determine any cause cognizable by courts of law or equity), and 24.011 (district court judge may grant all writs necessary to enforce the court's jurisdiction). Moreover, judicial oversight of public nuisance abatement in the context of this case is required by Texas jurisprudence. See  \b0 \i \ul0 City of Houston v. Lurie, 148 Tex. 391, 224 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. 1949)\b0 \i0 \ul0  ("It has been repeatedly held that the question whether property is a public nuisance and may be condemned as such is a justiciable question to be determined by a court."); \b0 \i \ul0 Hart v. City of Dallas, 565 S.W.2d 373, 379 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1978, no writ)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (whether the URSB or the city council made the determination that the house was a hazard to the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens, "the City would have been without authority to demolish the house in the absence of a [**71]  judicial determination that the house was a nuisance in fact."). Moreover, even if the Texas courts lacked express statutory or jurisprudential authority to issue warrants for the search or seizure of property, undoubtedly they are endowed with such authority by the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the State Constitution, and their inherent judicial powers.
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 II. DUE PROCESS\b0 \i0 \ul0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The plaintiffs cross-appealed the district court's ruling against their \b0 \i \ul0 Fifth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  claim. I dissent from the en banc majority's decision, affirming summary judgment in favor of the City of Dallas on the due process claim for the same reasons that I dissented from the panel's decision. See  \b0 \i \ul0 Freeman, 186 F.3d at 612-14\b0 \i0 \ul0  (Dennis, dissenting).
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 A governmental seizure of a person's property implicates two explicit textual sources of constitutional protection, the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth\b0 \i0 \ul0  and \b0 \i \ul0 Fifth Amendments\b0 \i0 \ul0 .  \b0 \i \ul0 James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 49-50\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. at 61, 70-71\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Although the decision in James Daniel Good Real Property was based upon the procedural protections of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the similarly worded procedural protections [**72]  of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause\b0 \i0 \ul0  apply with equal force to states and municipalities. \fs16 \super 23\fs20 \nosupersub 
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 23   The Supreme Court has held that the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause\b0 \i0 \ul0  "legitimately operates to extend to the citizens and residents of the States the same protection against arbitrary state legislation, affecting life, liberty and property, as is offered by the \b0 \i \ul0 Fifth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  against similar legislation by Congress." \b0 \i \ul0 Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325, 48 L. Ed. 195, 24 S. Ct. 88 (1903)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Of the guarantees of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fifth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , only the grand jury clause has been held not to be applicable to the states. 2 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law \'a7 14.2, at 347-48 (2d ed. 1992) (citing \b0 \i \ul0 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 28 L. Ed. 232, 4 S. Ct. 111 (1884))\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The \b0 \i \ul0 Fifth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  prohibitions of compulsory self-incrimination and double jeopardy were made applicable to the states in \b0 \i \ul0 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653, 84 S. Ct. 1489 (1964)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and \b0 \i \ul0 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707, 89 S. Ct. 2056 (1969)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , respectively. In addition, although the \b0 \i \ul0 Fifth Amendment's\b0 \i0 \ul0  just compensation provision has not "technically" been incorporated against the states, "the Court has held that the \b0 \i \ul0 fourteenth amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  due process guarantee provides the same safeguard against a state's taking of property without just compensation." 2 Rotunda & Nowak, supra, \'a7 14.2, at 350 (citing \b0 \i \ul0 Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 41 L. Ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897))\b0 \i0 \ul0 . See also  \b0 \i \ul0 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 541, 28 L. Ed. 232, 4 S. Ct. 111 (1884)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The \b0 \i \ul0 5th amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  provided that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.' This language is similar to that of the clause of the \b0 \i \ul0 14th amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  now under examination. That similarity was not accidental, but evinces a purpose to impose upon the States the same restrictions, in respect of proceedings involving life, liberty and property, which had been imposed upon the General Government.").
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [**73]   [*666]  The City does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure and destruction of the plaintiffs' real property deprived them of property interests protected by the \b0 \i \ul0 Fifth\b0 \i0 \ul0  and \b0 \i \ul0 Fourteenth Amendments\b0 \i0 \ul0 ' Due Process Clauses. The City argues, however, that a hearing before a panel of the City's own Urban Rehabilitation Standards Board afforded the plaintiffs all the process they were due before their property was seized and destroyed. I believe that in the absence of an extraordinary situation, which did not exist in the present case, the Due Process Clauses require that, before a person is deprived of his real property by the government, he must be given notice and an opportunity for a meaningful hearing before a neutral magistrate, and that there must be a judicial determination that the seizure is justified. 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Where the government seizes property not to preserve evidence of criminal wrongdoing but to assert ownership and control over the property, its action must also comply with the procedural protections of the \b0 \i \ul0 Due Process Clauses of the Fifth\b0 \i0 \ul0  and \b0 \i \ul0 Fourteenth Amendments\b0 \i0 \ul0 .  \b0 \i \ul0 James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 50\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The Supreme Court's precedents establish the general rule [**74]  that Due Process requires that, absent an extraordinary situation, a party cannot invoke the power of the state to seize a person's property without a prior judicial determination that the seizure is justified. \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. 555, 562 n.12, 103 S. Ct. 2005, 2010 n.12, 76 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1983)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (citing \b0 \i \ul0 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-379, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113, 91 S. Ct. 780 (1971))\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; see also  \b0 \i \ul0 North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751, 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 23 L. Ed. 2d 349, 89 S. Ct. 1820 (1974)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 40 L. Ed. 2d 406, 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Due Process also requires that individuals must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government deprives them of property.  \b0 \i \ul0 James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 48\b0 \i0 \ul0  (citing \b0 \i \ul0 $ 8,850, 461 U.S. at 562 n. 12\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 342\b0 \i0 \ul0  (Harlan, J., concurring); \b0 \i \ul0 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950)).\b0 \i0 \ul0  [**75]  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In James Daniel Good Real Property, the Supreme Court held that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the Due Process Clause requires the government to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in an adversary hearing, to ensure the requisite neutrality that must inform governmental decisionmaking, before seizing real property subject to civil forfeiture.  \b0 \i \ul0 510 U.S. at 48, 53-56\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The protection of an adversary hearing before a neutral magistrate is of particular importance where the government  [*667]  has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceeding.  \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 55-56\b0 \i0 \ul0 . In James Daniel Good Real Property, the Supreme Court emphasized that "the constitutional limitations we enforce in this case apply to real property in general, not simply to residences." \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 61\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Accordingly, the Due Process requirements of notice, a meaningful adversary hearing before a neutral magistrate, and a judicial determination of justification must be afforded to a person before his real property is seized and destroyed in order to abate or rehabilitate an "urban nuisance." In a case such as the present one, there is need for equally [**76]  rigorous adherence to the principles of Due Process as in civil forfeitures of real property. The City of Dallas has pecuniary interests in the outcome of such proceedings, e.g., justification for federal and state urban renewal grants; enhancement of the municipal tax base by promoting the replacement of old buildings with new ones. The need for safeguards against arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable seizures based on subjective standards may be even greater in "urban nuisance" or "urban rehabilitation" cases. Moreover, a post-seizure hearing cannot provide any remedy in such cases because the destroyed property cannot be restored and the best evidence of whether the seizure was justified will have been demolished also. It is not necessary to accomplish the City's legitimate goals of urban rehabilitation that an owner whose real property the City proposes to destroy be deprived of an opportunity for a meaningful pre-seizure adversary hearing before a neutral and impartial judge or magistrate. Requiring the City to postpone seizure and destruction until after such a hearing and judicial determination that the seizure is justified creates no significant administrative burden. And [**77]  any harm that results from delay is minimal in comparison to the injury occasioned by the erroneous seizure and destruction of real property. \b0 \i \ul0 Id. at 59\b0 \i0 \ul0 . 
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\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 III. CONCLUSION\b0 \i0 \ul0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In summary, Camara and See require a judicial warrant procedure for the administrative search or seizure of private property, except in consensual or emergency situations. Soldal does not overrule or modify Camara or See; it simply makes clear that the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  protects property as well as privacy and liberty. The Freeman \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0  majority correctly applied Camara, See, and Soldal, and the other circuits' decisions, except for one, are not in conflict with that interpretation. Thus, I would affirm the judgment against the City of Dallas.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Because the process used by the City of Dallas failed to meet the requirements of due process as dictated by the \b0 \i \ul0 Fifth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , I would also reverse the judgment for the City of Dallas and would grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on this claim.  
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