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\par \pard \f1 \fs20 \hyphpar0 216 Cal. App. 3d 1480, *; 265 Cal. Rptr. 579, **;\qc 
\par 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS 10, ***\qc 
\par }\pard 
\par \f1 \fs20 \cf \b0 \i0 \ul0 \pard \hyphpar0 \qc \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 LEXSEE 216 CAL.APP.3D. 1480
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LEE STEWART PAULSON, Defendant and Appellant
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 No. A044696 
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, Division Two
\par \pard 
\par \b \i \ul0 \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 216 Cal. App. 3d 1480\b \i0 \ul0 ; \b \i \ul0 265 Cal. Rptr. 579\b \i0 \ul0 ; \b \i \ul0 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS 10\b \i0 \ul0 
\par \pard 
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 January 4, 1990 
\par \pard 
\par 
\sect \sectd \marglsxn1296\sbknone \cols2 \colsx432 \b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: \b0 \i0 \ul0     [***1]  Appellant's petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 29, 1990.  
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 PRIOR HISTORY: \b0 \i0 \ul0    Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, No. 128372, Claude D. Perasso, Judge.  
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 DISPOSITION: \b0 \i0 \ul0    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the search in question satisfies the applicable Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness.  Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.  
\par \pard 
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 SUMMARY: \b0 \i0 \ul0 
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL REPORTS SUMMARY\b0 \i0 \ul0  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 An officer of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control conducted a search of a bar because of anonymous tip indicating that narcotics sales were occurring there.  The search was conducted without a warrant and pursuant to provisions of the Business and Professions Code prohibiting illegal activities on licensed premises.  Cocaine was found in the bar's safe, and the liquor license holder was convicted of one count of possession of cocaine (\b0 \i \ul0 Health & Saf. Code, \'a7 11350, subd. (a)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ). (Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, No. 128372, Claude D. Perasso, Judge.)
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the administrative search of defendant's bar was constitutionally reasonable.  The search advanced a substantial government interest, in that \b0 \i \ul0 Bus. & Prof. Code, \'a7 24200.5, subd. (a)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (revocation of liquor license for permitting illegal sales of drugs or narcotics), reflects a legislative judgment that the use of licensed premises for the purpose of drug sales poses a unique threat to the safety, welfare, health, peace, and morals of the people of the state that must be dealt with more vigorously than other illegal acts taking place on licensed premises.  Further, the court held, the prerequisite of a warrant in such instances could easily frustrate inspection, and the statues under which the search was authorized collectively provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant: \b0 \i \ul0 Bus. & Prof. Code, \'a7\'a7 25753\b0 \i0 \ul0 , \b0 \i \ul0 25755\b0 \i0 \ul0 , advise the licensee that inspections may take place during business hours and adequately limit the discretion of the inspectors as to the time, place, and scope of the search.  (Opinion by Kline, P. J., with Benson and Peterson, JJ., concurring.) 
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 HEADNOTES \b0 \i0 \ul0 
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL REPORTS HEADNOTES\b0 \i0 \ul0 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 Classified to California Digest of Official Reports, 3d Series  
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 (1) \b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Seaches and Seizures \'a7 9\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Constitutional and Statutory Provisions\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Administrative Searches.\b0 \i0 \ul0  --The prohibition of \b0 \i \ul0 U.S. Const., 4th Amend.\b0 \i0 \ul0 , against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to commercial premises, as well as to private homes. However, unlike searches of private homes, which generally must be conducted pursuant to a warrant in order to be reasonable, legislative schemes authorizing administrative searches of commercial property without a warrant do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment. The greater latitude to conduct such searches reflects the fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's homes, and that this privacy interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing inspections without warrant.
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 (2) \b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Searches and Seizures \'a7 9\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Constitutional and Statutory Provisions\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Administrative Searches\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Limitations.\b0 \i0 \ul0  --An exception to the warrant requirement exists for administrative searches of certain closely regulated industries that, by their vary nature, require unannounced visits from government agents. No reasonable expectation of privacy could exist fro a proprietor over the stock of such enterprises. However, an inspection without warrant will still be deemed unreasonable unless three criteria are met. There must be a substantial government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made; the inspections must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and the inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 (3) \b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Searches and Seizures \'a7 9\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Constitutional and Statutory Provisions\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Administrative Searches\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Where Regulated Conduct is Also Criminal.\b0 \i0 \ul0  --An administrative search of a business, made without warrant, may be upheld even though the administrative provisions under which the search is carried out proscribe conduct that is also criminal.
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 (4) \b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Searches and Seizures \'a7 54\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Wihout Warrant\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Test of Reasonableness\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Administrative Searches.\b0 \i0 \ul0  --The reasonableness of an administrative search carried out without a warrant depends on the specific enforcement needs and privacy guaranties of the administrative statute in question.
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 (5a) \b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 (5b) \b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Searches and Seizures \'a7 74\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Without Warrant\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Search of Premises\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Cases Inolving Illegal Drugs\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Administratve Search of Bar.\b0 \i0 \ul0  --A search of a bar, made because of an anonymous tip indicating that narcotics were occurring there, which search was conducted without a warrant and pursuant to provisions of the Business and Professions Code was constitutionally reasonable. It advanced a substantial government interest in that \b0 \i \ul0 Bus. & Prof. Code, \'a7 24200.5, subd (a)\b0 \i0 \ul0  (revocation of liquor license for permitting illegal sales of drugs or narcotics), reflects a legislative judgment that the use of licensed premises for the purpose of drug sales poses unique threat to the safety, welfare, health, peace, and morals of the people of the state that must be dealt with more vigorously than other illegal acts taking place on licensed premises. Further, the prequisite of a warrant in such instances could easily frustrate inspection, and the statutes under which the search was authorized collectively provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant: \b0 \i \ul0 Bus. & Prof. Code, \'a7\'a7 25752\b0 \i0 \ul0 , \b0 \i \ul0 25755\b0 \i0 \ul0 , advise the licensee that inspections may take place during business hours and adequately limit the discretion of the inspectors as to time, place, and scope.
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 (6) \b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Alcoholic Beverages \'a7 5\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Alcoholic Beverage Control Act\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Validity and Construction of Stature\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 --\b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 Prohibition of Permitting Illegal Drug Sales.\b0 \i0 \ul0  --Although the use of the word "permitted" in \b0 \i \ul0 Bus. & Prof. Code, \'a7 24200.5\b0 \i0 \ul0  (revocation of liquor license) indicates that the statute may have been primarily directed to the situation in which a licensee allows others to sell controlled substances or dangerous drugs on its premises, it would be anomalous not to construe it to include also the situation in which the licensee himself carries out the proscribed illegal sales.  
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 COUNSEL: \b0 \i0 \ul0 Arthur C. Lipton and David B. Harrison for Defendant and Appellant.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Assistant Attorney General, John H. Sugiyama, Assistant Attorney General, Herbert F. Wilkinson and David D. Salmon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 JUDGES: \b0 \i0 \ul0 Opinion by Kline, P. J., with Benson and Peterson, JJ., concurring.  
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 OPINION BY: \b0 \i0 \ul0 KLINE 
\par \pard 
\par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 OPINION
\par \b0 \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [*1483]   [**580]  Opinion
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Introduction
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Lee Stewart Paulson appeals his conviction following his plea of nolo contendere to one count of possession of cocaine.  ( \b0 \i \ul0 Health & Saf. Code, \'a7 11350, subd. (a)\b0 \i0 \ul0 .) The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for three years on condition he serve 90 days in the county jail.  He filed a timely appeal, challenging [***2]  the lawfulness of the search.  Specifically, he contends that the warrantless search of his bar by an officer of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (hereafter Department) exceeded the scope of administrative searches permissible under \b0 \i \ul0 Business and Professions Code sections 25753\b0 \i0 \ul0  and \b0 \i \ul0 25755\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \fs16 \super 1\fs20 \nosupersub  In the alternative, he contends those statutes are unconstitutional.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 1   All further statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code unless otherwise specified.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Statement of Facts
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 On February 11, 1988, an anonymous informer tipped the Department that narcotic sales were occurring on the premises of the "My House" bar in San Francisco, and that the narcotics were kept in a safe behind the bar on the premises.  A month later, on March 11, 1988, Jerry Meyer, a special investigator for the Department, went to the bar during its hours of operation, entered, identified himself, telephoned appellant (the holder of the liquor license at the premises),  [***3]  informed appellant he was conducting an inspection, and asked appellant to provide access to a safe and locked storage facility.  When appellant arrived Meyer, who did not have a search warrant, asked him to open the safe. Appellant did so.  Meyer did not seek to obtain consent, although appellant did not object.  Twenty-two bindles of cocaine, totaling 5.5 grams, were found in the safe.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 At the suppression hearing, Meyer testified that he searched the premises solely  [**581]  because of the tip regarding a narcotics violation.  Further, he maintained that the search was conducted under authority of Business and Professions Code sections prohibiting "any kind of illegal activity on licensed premises. . . ."
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Discussion
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 I. 
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 (1) The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to commercial premises, as well as to private homes.  (\b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger (1987) 482 U.S. 691, 699 [96 L.Ed.2d 601, 612, 107 S.Ct 
\sect 
\page  \b0 \i0 \ul0 [*1484]\b0 \i \ul0   2636]\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 312 [56 L.Ed.2d 305, 311, 98 S.Ct. 1816]\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 See \b0 \i0 \ul0 v.\b0 \i \ul0  City of Seattle (1967) 387 U.S. 541, 543, 546 [18 L.Ed.2d 943, 946, 947-948, 87 S.Ct. 1737]\b0 \i0 \ul0 .) [***4]  "However, unlike searches of private homes, which generally must be conducted pursuant to a warrant in order to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, legislative schemes authorizing warrantless administrative searches of commercial property do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property reflects the fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's home, and that this privacy interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless inspections. \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Biswell, supra, at 316\b0 \i0 \ul0 ." (\b0 \i \ul0 Donovan v. Dewey (1981) 452 U.S. 594, 598-599 [69 L.Ed.2d 262, 268-269, 101 S.Ct. 2534]\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Kim v. Dolch (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 736, 742 [219 Cal.Rptr. 248]\b0 \i0 \ul0 .)
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 (2) The Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the warrant [***5]  requirement for administrative searches of certain "closely regulated industries which, by their very nature, require unannounced visits from government agents." (\b0 \i \ul0 Terry York Imports, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 307, 319 [242 Cal.Rptr. 790]\b0 \i0 \ul0 .) \fs16 \super 2\fs20 \nosupersub  As the Supreme Court observed in \b0 \i \ul0 Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., supra, 436 U.S. 307, 313 [56 L.Ed.2d 305, 312]\b0 \i0 \ul0 : "Certain industries have such a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy . . . could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise." (See also, \b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. 691, 700 [96 L.Ed.2d at p.612\b0 \i0 \ul0 ].)
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 2   Such closely regulated industries have been recognized by the Supreme Court in \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade Corp. v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 72 [25 L.Ed.2d 60, 90 S.Ct. 774]\b0 \i0 \ul0  (liquor licensees); \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Biswell (1972) 406 U.S. 311 [32 L.Ed.2d 87, 92 S.Ct. 1593]\b0 \i0 \ul0  (licensed firearm dealers); \b0 \i \ul0 Donovan v. Dewey, supra, 452 U.S. 594\b0 \i0 \ul0  (underground and surface mines); and \b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. 691\b0 \i0 \ul0 . In California, the exception has been applied in \b0 \i \ul0 People v. Firstenberg (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 570 [155 Cal.Rptr. 80]\b0 \i0 \ul0 , certiorari denied \b0 \i \ul0 Firstenberg v. California (1980) 444 U.S. 1012 [62 L.Ed.2d 641, 100 S.Ct. 660]\b0 \i0 \ul0  (nursing homes); \b0 \i \ul0 Betchart v. Department of Fish and Game (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 1104 [205 Cal.Rptr. 135]\b0 \i0 \ul0  (preservation of fish and game); \b0 \i \ul0 People v. Harbor Hut Restaurant (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1151 [196 Cal.Rptr. 7]\b0 \i0 \ul0  (wholesale fish dealers); and \b0 \i \ul0 Kim v. Dolch, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d 736\b0 \i0 \ul0  (massage parlors).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized family day care homes as such an industry.  (\b0 \i \ul0 Rush v. Obledo (9th Cir. 1985) 756 F.2d 713\b0 \i0 \ul0 .)
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [***6]  The liquor industry, the quintessential "closely regulated" business, provided the first opportunity for the Supreme Court to articulate the exception.  In \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade Corp. v. United States, supra, 397 U.S. 72\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the court "considered a warrantless search of a catering business pursuant to several 
\sect 
\page  [*1485]  federal revenue statutes authorizing the inspection of the premises of liquor dealers. Although the court disapproved the search because the statute provided that a sanction be imposed when entry was refused, and because it did not authorize entry without a warrant as an alternative in this situation, it recognized that the liquor industry [was] long subject to close supervision and inspection.' \b0 \i \ul0 Id., at 77\b0 \i0 \ul0 ." (\b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. 691, 700 [96 L.Ed.2d at p. 612\b0 \i0 \ul0 ].) The court recognized that with respect to the liquor industry, Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures. (\b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade Corp. v. United States, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 77 [25 L.Ed.2d at pp. 64-65\b0 \i0 \ul0 ].)
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The closely regulated business exception, however, does not always operate [***7]  to eliminate the warrant requirement. Nor is a long tradition of close government supervision a dispositive consideration in this regard.  (\b0 \i \ul0 Donovan v. Dewey, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 606 [69 L.Ed.2d at pp.273-274\b0 \i0 \ul0 ]; \b0 \i \ul0 Bionic Auto Parts and Sales, Inc. v. Fahner (7th Cir. 1983) 721 F.2d 1072, 1079\b0 \i0 \ul0 .) The warrantless inspection of closely regulated business premises will be deemed unreasonable unless three criteria are met.  "First, there must be a substantial' government interest that informs regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made." (\b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. 691, 702 [96 L.Ed.2d at p. 614\b0 \i0 \ul0 ].) In \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade\b0 \i0 \ul0 , for example, a substantial federal interest was identified "in protecting the revenue against various types of fraud." (\b0 \i \ul0 397 U.S. at p. 75 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 64\b0 \i0 \ul0 ].) "Second, the warrantless inspections must be necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme.'" (\b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. 691, 702 [96 L.Ed.2d 601, 614]\b0 \i0 \ul0 , quoting \b0 \i \ul0 Donovan v. Dewey, supra, 452 U.S., at p. 600 [69 L.Ed.2d at p. 270\b0 \i0 \ul0 ].) "Finally, the statute's inspection [***8]  program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, [\b0 \i \ul0 must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant\b0 \i0 \ul0 .' [\b0 \i \ul0 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S., at p. 603\b0 \i0 \ul0 .] In other words, the regulatory statute must perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has \b0 \i \ul0 a properly defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers\b0 \i0 \ul0 .  [Italics added.] [Citations.] To perform this first function, the statute must be sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.' \b0 \i \ul0 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S., at 600\b0 \i0 \ul0 . In addition, in defining how a statute limits the discretion of the inspectors, we have observed that \b0 \i \ul0 it must be carefully limited in \b0 \i0 \ul0  \b0 \i \ul0 time, place and scope\b0 \i0 \ul0 .' [Italics added.]" (\b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. 691, 703 [96 L.Ed.2d 601, 614]\b0 \i0 \ul0 , quoting \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Biswell, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 315 [32 L.Ed.2d at p. 92\b0 \i0 \ul0 ].) [***9]  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 (3) It is for purposes of this case important to understand that a warrantless search may be upheld even though the administrative provisions 
\sect 
\page  [*1486]  proscribe conduct which is also criminal.  In \b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. 691\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search of an automobile junkyard pursuant to a statute authorizing such inspections. The statute was clearly aimed at controlling traffic in stolen vehicles and parts.  (\b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. 691, 708 [96 L.Ed.2d 601, 617]\b0 \i0 \ul0 .) Concluding that the business was "closely regulated," the court found the statute satisfied the three applicable criteria and rejected the conclusion of the New York Court of Appeals that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment as it had no truly administrative purpose but was " designed simply to give the police an expedient means of enforcing penal sanctions for possession of stolen property.' [Citation.]" (\b0 \i \ul0 482 U.S. at p. 698 [96 L.Ed.2d at p.611\b0 \i0 \ul0 ].) The Supreme Court observed that "a State can address a major social problem \b0 \i \ul0 both\b0 \i0 \ul0  by way of an administrative scheme \b0 \i \ul0 and\b0 \i0 \ul0  through penal sanctions.  [***10]  Administrative statutes and penal laws may have the same \b0 \i \ul0 ultimate\b0 \i0 \ul0  purpose of remedying the social problem, but they have different subsidiary purposes and prescribe different methods of addressing the problem.  An administrative statute establishes how a particular business in a closely regulated' industry should be operated, setting forth rules to guide an operator's conduct of the business and allowing government officials to ensure that those rules are followed.  Such a regulatory approach contrasts with that of the penal laws, a major emphasis of which is the punishment of  [**583]  individuals for specific acts of behavior." (\b0 \i \ul0 482 U.S. at pp. 712-713 [96 L.Ed.2d at p. 620\b0 \i0 \ul0 ], italics in original.) The court declared the statute there at issue "serves the regulatory goals of seeking to ensure that vehicle dismantlers are legitimate businesspersons and that stolen vehicles and vehicle parts passing through automobile junkyards can be identified." (\b0 \i \ul0 482 U.S. at p. 714 [96 L.Ed. 2d at p.621\b0 \i0 \ul0 ], fn. omitted.) \fs16 \super 3\fs20 \nosupersub 
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 3   The dissent in \b0 \i \ul0 Burger\b0 \i0 \ul0  warned of the dangers of such approach, fearing that it would allow the Legislature to "abrogate constitutional protections simply by saying that the purpose of an administrative search scheme is to prevent a certain type of crime." (482 U.S. 718, 728 [96 L.Ed. 2d at p. 630] [dis. opn. of Brennan, J.].) The dissent also noted that the case did not present "the more difficult question whether a State could take any criminal conduct, make it an administrative violation, and then search without probable cause for violations of the newly created administrative rule.  The increasing overlap of administrative and criminal violations creates an obvious temptation for the State to do so, and plainly toleration of this type of pretextual search would allow an end-run around the protections of the Fourth Amendment." (482 U.S. 728, fn. 17 [96 L.Ed.2d at p. 630].)
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [***11]  (4) Keeping in mind that the reasonableness of a warrantless search depends on the specific enforcement needs and privacy guaranties of the statute in question (\b0 \i \ul0 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, 436 U.S. at p. 321 [56 L.Ed.2d at pp. 316-317\b0 \i0 \ul0 ]), we turn to the California statutory scheme at issue here.
\par 
\sect 
\page \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360  [*1487]  II.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 A.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The Alcoholic Beverage Control Act is contained in division 9 of the Business and Professions Code.  Pursuant to \b0 \i \ul0 section 25753\b0 \i0 \ul0 , "The department may make any examination of the books and records of any licensee or other person and may visit and inspect the premises of any licensee it may deem necessary to perform its duties under this division."
\par \b0 \i \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Section 25755\b0 \i0 \ul0  provides in relevant part as follows: "The director and the persons employed by the department for the administration and enforcement of this division are peace officers in the enforcement of the penal provisions of this division, the rules of the department adopted under the provisions of this division, and any other penal provisions of law of this state prohibiting or regulating the sale, exposing for sale, use, possession, giving away, adulteration, dilution, misbranding or [***12]  mislabeling of alcoholic beverages or intoxicating liquors, and such persons are authorized, while acting as peace officers, to enforce any penal provisions of law while they are in, on, or about any licensed premises in the course of their employment.  [para.] The director, the persons employed by the department of the administration and enforcement of this division, and peace officers . . . may, in enforcing the provisions of this division, visit and inspect the premises of any licensee at any time during which the licensee is exercising the privileges authorized by his or her license on the premises."
\par \b0 \i \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Section 24200\b0 \i0 \ul0  sets forth the grounds upon which the Department may suspend or revoke a license. Among the grounds listed are "[w]hen the continuance of a license would be contrary to public welfare or morals" (subd. (a)) and conviction of "any public offense involving moral turpitude" (subd. (d)).
\par \b0 \i \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Section 24200.5, subdivision (a)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , which relates to mandatory revocation, provides in part that, "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of \b0 \i \ul0 Section 24200\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the department shall revoke a license . . . [i]f a retail licensee has knowingly permitted the illegal sale, or negotiations for such [***13]  sales, of controlled substances or dangerous drugs upon his licensed premises."
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 B.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 (5a) Appellant contends that Officer Meyer's search cannot be upheld, and the fruits thereof must be suppressed, because the search exceeded the scope of the officer's statutory authority.  According to appellant, \b0 \i \ul0 section 25755\b0 \i0 \ul0  would be constitutionally overbroad if construed to permit persons 
\sect 
\page  [*1488]  employed by the Department to make inspections of licensed premises for the enforcement of penal laws unrelated to the central purpose of the Alcoholic  [**584]  Beverage Control Act. The purpose of the act, appellant emphasizes, is regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages, not controlled substances and dangerous drugs. \fs16 \super 4\fs20 \nosupersub  Appellant also contends that the statutory proscription on "any public offense involving moral turpitude" does not limit the discretion of suspecting officers, as the Supreme Court has required (\b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 703 [96 L.Ed.2d at p. 614\b0 \i0 \ul0 ]) because the concept of moral turpitude "defies any attempt at a uniform and precise definition." (\b0 \i \ul0 Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Bd. (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 30, 36 [152 Cal.Rptr. 285]\b0 \i0 \ul0 .) [***14]  Permitting employees of the Department to conduct warrantless searches of licensed premises for evidence of any public offense they believe involves moral turpitude, appellant argues, "devolves almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to search." (\b0 \i \ul0 Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., supra, 436 U.S. at p. 323 [56 L.Ed.2d at pp. 317-318\b0 \i0 \ul0 ].)
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 4   As used in the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (\b0 \i \ul0 \'a7 24200.5\b0 \i0 \ul0 ) and in this opinion, "controlled substances" has the same meaning as is given that term in article 1 (commencing with \'a7 11000) of chapter 1 of division 10 of the Health and Safety Code, and "dangerous drugs" has the same meaning given that term in article 8 (commencing with \'a7 4210) of chapter 9 of division 2 of the Business and Professions Code.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 We need not address appellant's challenge to the use of \b0 \i \ul0 section 24200\b0 \i0 \ul0 , because the Department does not attempt to justify the warrantless search of appellant's premises [***15]  solely on the basis of the broad language of that statute; the Department relies as well on considerably more specific language in \b0 \i \ul0 section 24200.5\b0 \i0 \ul0 .  < (6) See fn. 5.> As earlier noted, \b0 \i \ul0 section 24200.5\b0 \i0 \ul0  provides, inter alia, that, "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of \b0 \i \ul0 section 24200\b0 \i0 \ul0  [relating to \b0 \i \ul0 discretionary\b0 \i0 \ul0  suspension or revocation], the department \b0 \i \ul0 shall\b0 \i0 \ul0  revoke a license . . . if a retail licensee has knowingly permitted the illegal sale, or negotiations for such sales, of controlled substances or dangerous drugs upon his licensed premises." (\b0 \i \ul0 \'a7 24200.5, subd. (a)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , italics added.) \fs16 \super 5\fs20 \nosupersub 
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 5   Though the use of the word "permitted" indicates the statute may have been primarily directed to the situation in which a licensee allows others to sell controlled substances of dangerous drugs on his premises, it would be anomalous not to construe it to also include the situation in which, as here, the licensee himself carries out the proscribed illegal sales.
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Permitting the sale of controlled substances or dangerous [***16]  drugs on licensed premises (which, incidentally, has been adjudicated to involve moral turpitude (\b0 \i \ul0 Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Bd., supra, 89 Cal.App.3d 30\b0 \i0 \ul0 ), is the only public offense not itself involving alcoholic beverages requiring license revocation. \fs16 \super 6\fs20 \nosupersub  (5b) \b0 \i \ul0 Subdivision (a) of section 24200.5\b0 \i0 \ul0  therefore 
\sect 
\page  [*1489]  reflects a legislative judgment that the use of licensed premises for this purpose poses a unique threat to "the safety, welfare, health, peace and morals of the people of the State" (\'a7 23001) that must be dealt with more vigorously than almost all other illegal acts that may take place on licensed premises.  Drugs and alcohol are both intensively regulated mind-altering substances; are both subject to abuse and addictive; are both attractive to many young persons and others who frequent licensed premises; and their adverse effects are often exacerbated when they are used at or about the same time.  In other words, trafficking in dangerous drugs is a particularized criminal act warranting special attention by those charged with enforcement of laws regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages. Absent the threat of mandatory revocation, [***17]  the Legislature apparently reasoned, such premises would provide a tempting venue for the sale of dangerous drugs.
\par \pard 
\par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 6   The only other ground for mandatory revocation is "[i]f the licensee has employed or permitted any persons to solicit or encourage others, directly or indirectly, to buy them drinks in the licensed premises under any commission, percentage, salary, or other profit-sharing plan, scheme, or conspiracy." (\b0 \i \ul0 \'a7 24200.5, subd. (b)\b0 \i0 \ul0 .)
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 For the foregoing reasons, the inspection of appellant's premises advances "a substantial' government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection [was] made" and therefore  [**585]  satisfies the first of the three applicable criteria for a warrantless search of a closely regulated business first set forth in \b0 \i \ul0 Donovan v. Dewey, supra, 452 U.S. at page 600 [69 L.Ed.2d at pages 269-270\b0 \i0 \ul0 ] and most recently reaffirmed in \b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. at page 702 [96 L.Ed.2d at pages 613-614\b0 \i0 \ul0 ]. [***18]  
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The warrantless inspection also meets the second criterion because, as the United States Supreme Court has pointed out, violations of law that can be quickly concealed, such as the sale of contraband, can only be deterred by frequent and unannounced inspections. " In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection; and if the necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency is to be preserved, the protections afforded by a warrant would be negligible.'" (\b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 710 [96 L.Ed.2d at p. 619\b0 \i0 \ul0 ], quoting \b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Biswell, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 316 [32 L.Ed.2d at p. 92\b0 \i0 \ul0 ].)
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The inspection satisfies the final criterion because it was authorized by statutes -- \b0 \i \ul0 sections 24200.5\b0 \i0 \ul0 , \b0 \i \ul0 25753\b0 \i0 \ul0  and \b0 \i \ul0 25755\b0 \i0 \ul0  -- which collectively provide a " constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.'" (\b0 \i \ul0 New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 703 [96 L.Ed.2d at p. 614\b0 \i0 \ul0 ], quoting \b0 \i \ul0 Donovan v. Dewey, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 603 [69 L.Ed.2d at p. 272\b0 \i0 \ul0 ].) That is, \b0 \i \ul0 section 24200.5\b0 \i0 \ul0  explicitly informs a licensee that "permitt[ing] the illegal sale, or negotiations [***19]  for such sales, of controlled substances or dangerous drugs upon his licensed premises" is specifically prohibited.  \b0 \i \ul0 Sections 25753\b0 \i0 \ul0  and 
\sect 
\page  [*1490]  \b0 \i \ul0 25755\b0 \i0 \ul0  additionally advise licensees that it is the duty of the Department and its duly authorized employees to enforce that prohibition, and that such employees are authorized to act as peace officers and may "visit and inspect the premises of any licensee at any time during which the licensee is exercising the privileges authorized by his or her license on the premises." (\b0 \i \ul0 \'a7 25755\b0 \i0 \ul0 .) A licensee thus cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections during business hours for the specific purpose of determining whether he is permitting the sale of controlled substances or dangerous drugs on his premises.  (\b0 \i \ul0 Donovan v. Dewey, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 600 [69 L.Ed.2d at pp. 269-270\b0 \i0 \ul0 ].) Therefore, this is not a case in which, as a condition of doing business, the state has required a blanket submission to warrantless searches at any time or for any purpose.  (Compare \b0 \i \ul0 Finn's Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liquor Authority (1969) 24 N.Y.2d 647, 249 N.E.2d 440, 443-445\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; \b0 \i \ul0 Washington Massage Foundation v. Nelson (1976) 87 Wn.2d 948 [558 P.2d 231]\b0 \i0 \ul0 .) [***20]  The time, place, and scope of authorized inspections adequately limit the discretion of the Department's inspectors. (\b0 \i \ul0 United States v. Biswell, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 315 [32 L.Ed.2d at pp. 91-92\b0 \i0 \ul0 ].)
\par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the search in question satisfies the applicable Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness.  Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.  
\par 
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