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Ed. 2d 87, ***; 1972 U.S. LEXIS 60\qc \par }\pard \par \f1 \fs20 \cf \b0 \i0 \ul0 \pard \hyphpar0 \qc \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 LEXSEE 406 US 311 \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 UNITED STATES v. BISWELL \par \pard \par \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 No. 71-81 \par \pard \par \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES \par \pard \par \b \i \ul0 \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 406 U.S. 311\b \i0 \ul0 ; \b \i \ul0 92 S. Ct. 1593\b \i0 \ul0 ; \b \i \ul0 32 L. Ed. 2d 87\b \i0 \ul0 ; \b \i \ul0 1972 U.S. LEXIS 60\b \i0 \ul0 \par \pard \par \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 March 28, 1972, Argued \par \pard \qc \li1200\ri1200 \sb0 \fi0 May 15, 1972, Decided \par \pard \par \sect \sectd \marglsxn1296\sbknone \cols2 \colsx432 \b0 \i0 \ul0 \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 PRIOR HISTORY: \b0 \i0 \ul0 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT. \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 DISPOSITION: \b0 \i0 \ul0 \b0 \i \ul0 442 F.2d 1189\b0 \i0 \ul0 , reversed and remanded. \par \pard \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 SUMMARY: \b0 \i0 \ul0 \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The defendant, a pawnshop operator who was federally licensed to deal in sporting weapons, was visited one afternoon by a federal treasury agent who identified himself, inspected the defendant's books, and requested entry into a locked gun storeroom. The defendant asked whether the agent had a search warrant, and the agent said that he did not, but that his inspection of the storeroom was authorized by 923(g) of the Gun Control Act of 1968. \b0 \i \ul0 Section 923(g)\b0 \i0 \ul0 authorizes a treasury agent, during business hours, to enter the premises, including places of storage, of any firearms dealer for the purpose of inspecting or examining any records or documents required to be kept and any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such dealer at such premises. After being given a copy of 923(g) to read, the defendant replied that if that was the law, he guessed it was all right for the agent to inspect the storeroom. The defendant then unlocked the storeroom, and the agent found and seized two sawed-off rifles with respect to which the defendant had not paid a special occupational tax required under \b0 \i \ul0 5845 of the Internal Revenue Code\b0 \i0 \ul0 . In the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, the defendant was convicted of wilfully and knowingly engaging in business as a dealer in firearms without having paid the special occupational tax. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that 923(g)'s authorization of warrantless searches violated the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and that the defendant's ostensible consent to the search was invalid (\b0 \i \ul0 442 F2d 1189\b0 \i0 \ul0 ). \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by White, J., expressing the views of seven members of the court, it was held that if the Gun Control Act was to be properly enforced and inspection made effective, inspections without warrant had to be deemed reasonable official conduct under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 ; that since the search of the defendant's storeroom was not accompanied by any unauthorized force, the Supreme Court's decision in \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade Catering Corp. v United States, 397 US 72, 25 L Ed 2d 60, 90 S Ct 774\b0 \i0 \ul0 , was distinguishable from the present case; and that since the search was based on the authority of a valid statute, the lawfulness of the search did not depend on the defendant's consent. \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Blackmun, J., concurred in the result on the ground that the Colonnade Case had been incorrectly decided. \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Douglas, J., dissented on the grounds that 923(g)'s authorization of warrantless inspections was unconstitutional on the basis of the Colonnade Case, and that the defendant's ostensible consent to the search was invalid. \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES: \b0 \i0 \ul0 \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 [***LEdHN1] \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 SEARCH AND SEIZURE \'a725 \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 necessity of warrant -- \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Headnote:[1A][1B] \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 A warrantless inspection conducted pursuant to 923(g) of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (\b0 \i \ul0 18 USCS 923(g)\b0 \i0 \ul0 ), authorizing a federal treasury agent, during business hours, to enter the premises, including places of storage, of any firearms dealer for the purpose of inspecting or examining any records or documents required to be kept and any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such dealer at such premises, is not an unreasonable search under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , nor is there an unreasonable seizure under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 of sawed-off rifles with respect to which a pawnshop operator has not paid a special occupational tax required under the Internal Revenue Code (\b0 \i \ul0 26 USCS 5845\b0 \i0 \ul0 ), where (1) the pawnshop operator, who was federally licensed to deal in sporting weapons, was visited one afternoon by a federal treasury agent who identified himself, inspected the pawnshop operator's books, and requested entry into a locked gun storeroom, (2) the pawnshop operator asked whether the agent had a search warrant, and the agent said that he did not, but that the inspection of the storeroom was authorized by 923(g), (3) after being given a copy of 923(g) to read, the pawnshop operator replied that if that was the law, he guessed it was all right for the agent to inspect the storeroom, and (4) the pawnshop operator then unlocked the storeroom, and the agent found and seized the sawed-off rifles. \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 [***LEdHN2] \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 SEARCH AND SEIZURE \'a725 \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 necessity of warrant -- \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Headnote:[2] \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 If the target of a warrantless inspection is a federally licensed liquor dealer, and if the search is not accompanied by any unauthorized force, the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 does not bar a seizure of illicit liquor. \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 [***LEdHN3] \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 SEARCH AND SEIZURE \'a714 \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 SEARCH AND SEIZURE \'a724 \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 SEARCH AND SEIZURE \'a725 \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 consent -- warrant -- \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Headnote:[3] \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 When a federal treasury agent asks to inspect the locked storeroom of a pawnshop operator who is federally licensed to deal in sporting weapons, the pawnshop operator's submission to lawful authority and his decision to step aside and permit the inspection rather than face a criminal prosecution is analogous to a householder's acquiescence in a search pursuant to a warrant when the alternative is a possible criminal prosecution for refusing entry or a forcible entry; in neither case does the lawfulness of the search depend on consent; in both cases, there is lawful authority independent of the will of the householder who might, other things being equal, prefer no search at all. \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 [***LEdHN4] \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 SEARCH AND SEIZURE \'a714 \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 SEARCH AND SEIZURE \'a725 \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 consent -- warrant -- \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Headnote:[4] \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In the context of a regulatory inspection system of business premises which is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of a warrantless search depends not on consent, but on the authority of a valid statute. \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 [***LEdHN5] \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 SEARCH AND SEIZURE \'a725 \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 necessity of warrant -- \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Headnote:[5] \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 If the Gun Control Act of 1968 (\b0 \i \ul0 18 USCS 921 et seq.\b0 \i0 \ul0 ) is to be properly enforced and inspection made effective, inspections without warrant must be deemed reasonable official conduct under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 [***LEdHN6] \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 SEARCH AND SEIZURE \'a725 \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 necessity of warrant -- \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Headnote:[6] \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Where regulatory inspections further urgent federal interest, and where the possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspections may proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute. \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 SYLLABUS \par \b0 \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Warrantless search of locked storeroom during business hours as part of inspection procedure authorized by \b0 \i \ul0 \'a7 923 (g)\b0 \i0 \ul0 of the Gun Control Act of 1968, which resulted in the seizure of unlicensed firearms from a dealer federally licensed to deal in sporting weapons \b0 \i \ul0 held\b0 \i0 \ul0 not violative of \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Pp. 311-317. \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 COUNSEL: \b0 \i0 \ul0 R. Kent Greenawalt argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Petersen, Jerome M. Feit, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Kirby W. Patterson. \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 Warren F. Reynolds argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 John S. Edmunds and Melvin L. Wulf filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance. \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 JUDGES: \b0 \i0 \ul0 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 317. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 317. \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 OPINION BY: \b0 \i0 \ul0 WHITE \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 OPINION \par \b0 \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 [*311] [***90] [**1594] MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 [***LEdHR1A] [1A]The Gun Control Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1213, \b0 \i \ul0 18 U. S. C. \'a7 921 et seq.\b0 \i0 \ul0 , authorizes official entry during business hours into "the premises (including places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition . . . dealer . . . for the purpose of inspecting or examining (1) any records or documents required to be kept . . . and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such . . . dealer . . . at \sect \page [*312] such premises." \fs16 \super 1\fs20 \nosupersub \b0 \i \ul0 18 U. S. C. \'a7 923 (g)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Respondent, a pawn shop operator who was federally licensed to deal in sporting weapons, was visited one afternoon by a city policeman and a Federal Treasury agent who identified himself, inspected respondent's books, and requested entry into a locked gun storeroom. Respondent asked whether the agent had a search warrant, and the investigator told him that he did not, but that \b0 \i \ul0 \'a7 923 (g)\b0 \i0 \ul0 authorized such inspections. Respondent was given a copy of the section to read and he replied, "Well, that's what it says so I guess it's okay." Respondent unlocked the storeroom, and the agent found and seized two sawed-off rifles which respondent was not licensed to possess. He was indicted and convicted for dealing in firearms without \sect \page [*313] having paid the required special occupational tax. \fs16 \super 2\fs20 \nosupersub The Court of Appeals [***91] reversed, [**1595] however, holding that \b0 \i \ul0 \'a7 923 (g)\b0 \i0 \ul0 was unconstitutional under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 because it authorized warrantless searches of business premises and that respondent's ostensible consent to the search was invalid under \b0 \i \ul0 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The Court of Appeals concluded that the sawed-off rifles, having been illegally seized, were inadmissible in evidence. \b0 \i \ul0 442 F.2d 1189 (CA10 1971)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . We granted certiorari, \b0 \i \ul0 404 U.S. 983 (1971),\b0 \i0 \ul0 and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 1 "Each licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, and licensed collector shall maintain such records of importation, production, shipment, receipt, sale, or other disposition, of firearms and ammunition at such place, for such period, and in such form as the Secretary [of the Treasury] may by regulations prescribe. Such importers, manufacturers, dealers, and collectors shall make such records available for inspection at all reasonable times, and shall submit to the Secretary such reports and information with respect to such records and the contents thereof as he shall by regulations prescribe. The Secretary may enter during business hours the premises (including places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector for the purpose of inspecting or examining (1) any records or documents required to be kept by such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector under the provisions of this chapter or regulations issued under this chapter, and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or collector at such premises. Upon the request of any State or any political subdivision thereof, the Secretary may make available to such State or any political subdivision thereof, any information which he may obtain by reason of the provisions of this chapter with respect to the identification of persons within such State or political subdivision thereof, who have purchased or received firearms or ammunition, together with a description of such firearms or ammunition." \b0 \i \ul0 18 U. S. C. \'a7 923 (g)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 2 Respondent was licensed under \b0 \i \ul0 18 U. S. C. \'a7 923\b0 \i0 \ul0 to sell certain sporting weapons as defined in \b0 \i \ul0 18 U. S. C. \'a7 921\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The sawed-off rifles, however, fell under \b0 \i \ul0 26 U. S. C. \'a7 5845\b0 \i0 \ul0 's technical definition of "firearms," and every dealer in such firearms was required by \b0 \i \ul0 26 U. S. C. \'a7 5801\b0 \i0 \ul0 to pay a special occupational tax of $ 200 a year. Such firearms are also required to be registered to a dealer in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. \b0 \i \ul0 26 U. S. C. \'a7 5841\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Respondent was indicted on six counts. Count I, on which he was convicted, charged that he had "wilfully and knowingly engaged in business as a dealer in firearms, as defined by \b0 \i \ul0 26 U. S. C. 5845\b0 \i0 \ul0 . . . without having paid the special (occupational) tax required by \b0 \i \ul0 26 U. S. C. 5801\b0 \i0 \ul0 for his business." Counts II-V, on which he was acquitted, charged that he had possessed certain firearms that were not identified by serial number, as required by \b0 \i \ul0 26 U. S. C. \'a7 5842\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and that were not registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record, as required by \b0 \i \ul0 26 U. S. C. \'a7 5841\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Count VI, which charged respondent with failing to maintain properly the records required under \b0 \i \ul0 18 U. S. C. \'a7 923\b0 \i0 \ul0 , was severed and is awaiting trial. \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 As the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, we had no occasion in \b0 \i \ul0 See\b0 \i0 \ul0 v. \b0 \i \ul0 City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , to consider the reach of the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 with respect to various federal regulatory statutes. In \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade Catering Corp\b0 \i0 \ul0 . v. \b0 \i \ul0 United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , we dealt with the statutory authorization for warrantless inspections of federally licensed dealers in alcoholic beverages. There, federal inspectors, without a warrant \sect \page [*314] and without the owner's permission, had forcibly entered a locked storeroom and seized illegal liquor. Emphasizing the historically broad authority of the Government to regulate the liquor industry and the approval of similar inspection laws of this kind in \b0 \i \ul0 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , \fs16 \super 3\fs20 \nosupersub we concluded that Congress had ample power "to design such powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand." \b0 \i \ul0 397 U.S., at 76\b0 \i0 \ul0 . We found, however, that Congress had not expressly provided for forcible entry in the absence of a warrant and had instead given Government agents a remedy by making it a criminal offense to refuse admission to the inspectors under \b0 \i \ul0 26 U. S. C. \'a7 7342\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 3 "The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or concealed to avoid the duties payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least two centuries past; and the like seizures have been authorized by our own revenue acts from the commencement of the government. The first statute passed by Congress to regulate the collection of duties, the act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43, contains provisions to this effect. As this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable,' and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment. . . . In the case of excisable or dutiable articles, the government has an interest in them for the payment of the duties thereon, and until such duties are paid has a right to keep them under observation, or to pursue and drag them from concealment." \b0 \i \ul0 116 U.S., at 623-624\b0 \i0 \ul0 (footnote omitted). \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 [***LEdHR2] [2] [***LEdHR3] [3] [***LEdHR4] [4]Here, the search was not accompanied by any unauthorized force, and if the target of the inspection had been a federally licensed liquor dealer, it is clear under \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade\b0 \i0 \ul0 that the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 would not bar a seizure of illicit liquor. When the officers asked to inspect respondent's locked storeroom, [**1596] they were merely asserting their statutory right, and respondent was on \sect \page [*315] notice as to their identity and the legal basis for their action. Respondent's submission to \b0 \i \ul0 lawful\b0 \i0 \ul0 authority and his decision to step aside and permit the inspection rather than face a criminal prosecution \fs16 \super 4\fs20 \nosupersub [***92] is analogous to a householder's acquiescence in a search pursuant to a warrant when the alternative is a possible criminal prosecution for refusing entry or a forcible entry. In neither case does the lawfulness of the search depend on consent; in both, there is lawful authority independent of the will of the householder who might, other things being equal, prefer no search at all. In this context, \b0 \i \ul0 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , is inapposite, since there the police relied on a warrant that was never shown to be valid; because their demand for entry was not pursuant to lawful authority, the acquiescence of the householder was held an involuntary consent. In the context of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute. \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 4 Congress has made it a crime to violate any provision of the Gun Control Act. \b0 \i \ul0 18 U. S. C. \'a7 924\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 We think a like result is required in the present case, which involves a similar inspection system aimed at federally licensed dealers in firearms. Federal regulation of the interstate traffic in firearms is not as deeply rooted in history as is governmental control of the liquor industry, but close scrutiny of this traffic is undeniably of central importance to federal efforts to prevent violent crime and to assist the States in regulating the firearms traffic within their borders. See Congressional Findings and Declaration, Note preceding \b0 \i \ul0 18 U. S. C. \'a7 922\b0 \i0 \ul0 . Large interests are at stake, and inspection is a crucial part of the regulatory scheme, since it assures that weapons are distributed through regular channels and in \sect \page [*316] a traceable manner and makes possible the prevention of sales to undesirable customers and the detection of the origin of particular firearms. \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 [***LEdHR5] [5]It is also apparent that if the law is to be properly enforced and inspection made effective, inspections without warrant must be deemed reasonable official conduct under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 . In \b0 \i \ul0 See\b0 \i0 \ul0 v. \b0 \i \ul0 City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , the mission of the inspection system was to discover and correct violations of the building code, conditions that were relatively difficult to conceal or to correct in a short time. Periodic inspection sufficed, and inspection warrants could be required and privacy given a measure of protection with little if any threat to the effectiveness of the inspection system there at issue. We expressly refrained in that case from questioning a warrantless regulatory search such as that authorized by \b0 \i \ul0 \'a7 923\b0 \i0 \ul0 of the Gun Control Act. Here, if inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection; and if the necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency is to be preserved, the protections afforded by a warrant would be negligible. \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 It is also plain that inspections for compliance with the Gun Control Act pose only limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy. When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to [***93] effective inspection. Each licensee is annually furnished with a revised compilation of ordinances that describe his obligations and define the inspector's authority. \b0 \i \ul0 18 U. S. C. \'a7 921 (a)(19)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The dealer is not left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task. \par \sect \page \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 [*317] [**1597] [***LEdHR1B] [1B] [***LEdHR6] [6]We have little difficulty in concluding that where, as here, regulatory inspections further urgent federal interest, and the possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute. The seizure of respondent's sawed-off rifles was not unreasonable under the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 , and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. \par \b0 \i \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 So ordered\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 CONCUR BY: \b0 \i0 \ul0 BLACKMUN \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 CONCUR \par \b0 \i0 \ul0 \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the result. \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 Had I been a member of the Court when \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade Catering Corp\b0 \i0 \ul0 . v. \b0 \i \ul0 United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , was decided, I would have joined the respective dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Black and of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 397 U.S., at 79 and 77. I therefore concur in the result here. \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 DISSENT BY: \b0 \i0 \ul0 DOUGLAS \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 DISSENT \par \b0 \i0 \ul0 \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 As Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the three-judge panel in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit said, the Federal Gun Control Act, \b0 \i \ul0 18 U. S. C. \'a7 923 (g)\b0 \i0 \ul0 , has a provision for inspection that is "almost identical" with the one in \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade Catering Corp\b0 \i0 \ul0 . v. \b0 \i \ul0 United States, 397 U.S. 72\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The present one provides: \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 "The Secretary may enter during business hours the premises (including places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition . . . dealer . . . for the purpose of inspecting or examining (1) any records or documents required to be kept . . . and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such . . . dealer . . . ." \b0 \i \ul0 18 U. S. C. \'a7 923 (g)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 [*318] The one in \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade\b0 \i0 \ul0 provided: \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 "The Secretary or his delegate may enter during business hours the premises . . . of any dealer for the purpose of inspecting or examining any records or other documents required to be kept . . . under this chapter . . . ." \b0 \i \ul0 26 U. S. C. \'a7 5146 (b)\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 The Court legitimates this inspection scheme because of its belief that, had respondent been a dealer in liquor instead of firearms, such a search as was here undertaken would have been valid under the principles of \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade\b0 \i0 \ul0 . I respectfully disagree. \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade\b0 \i0 \ul0 , of course, rested heavily on the unique historical origins of governmental regulation of liquor. And the Court admits that similar regulation of the firearms traffic "is not as deeply rooted in history as is governmental control of the liquor industry." Yet, assuming, \b0 \i \ul0 arguendo\b0 \i0 \ul0 , that the firearms industry is as appropriate a subject of pervasive governmental inspection as is the liquor industry, the Court errs. \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 In \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade\b0 \i0 \ul0 , we agreed that "Congress has broad power to design such powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to [***94] meet the evils at hand." \b0 \i \ul0 397 U.S., at 76\b0 \i0 \ul0 . But we also said: \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 "Where Congress has authorized inspection but made no rules governing the procedure that inspectors must follow, the \b0 \i \ul0 Fourth Amendment\b0 \i0 \ul0 and its various restrictive rules apply." \b0 \i \ul0 Id., at 77\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 Here, the statute authorizing inspection is virtually identical to the one we considered in \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade\b0 \i0 \ul0 . The conclusion necessarily follows that Congress, as in \b0 \i \ul0 Colonnade\b0 \i0 \ul0 , has here "selected a standard that does not include forcible entries without a warrant." \b0 \i \ul0 Ibid\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 [**1598] In my view, a search conducted over the objection of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is "forcible," whether or not violent means are used to effect [*319] the search. In this case, the owner withdrew his objection upon being shown a copy of the statute authorizing inspection, saying: "If that is the law, I guess it is all right." If we apply the test of "consent" that we used in \b0 \i \ul0 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543\b0 \i0 \ul0 , we would affirm this judgment, \fs16 \super *\fs20 \nosupersub for as MR. JUSTICE STEWART, speaking for the Court in \b0 \i \ul0 Bumper\b0 \i0 \ul0 , said: \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 "When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was invalid. The result can be no different when it turns out that the State does not even attempt to rely upon the validity of the warrant, or fails to show that there was, in fact, any warrant at all. \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 "When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion -- albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent." \b0 \i \ul0 Id., at 548-550\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li600\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 * The majority concludes that \b0 \i \ul0 Bumper\b0 \i0 \ul0 is "inapposite" to this case. \b0 \i \ul0 Bumper\b0 \i0 \ul0 holds that an \b0 \i \ul0 otherwise invalid\b0 \i0 \ul0 search is not legitimated because of the occupant's consent to a law enforcement officer's assertion of authority. \b0 \i \ul0 Bumper\b0 \i0 \ul0 is only "inapposite" if one has already concluded that consent is irrelevant to the validity of the search at issue. \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb120 \fi360 I would affirm the judgment below. \par \pard \par \b \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 REFERENCES \par \b0 \i0 \ul0 \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 Am Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures (1st ed 16) \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 18 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms, Searches and Seizures, Form 18:281 \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 5 Am Jur Trials 331, Excluding Illegally Obtained Evidence \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 US L Ed Digest, Search and Seizure 25 \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 ALR Digests, Search and Seizure 17 \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 L Ed Index to Anno, Search and Seizure \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 ALR Quick Index, Search and Seizure; Weapons \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 Federal Quick Index, Search and Seizure; Weapons \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 Annotation References: \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 Constitutionality of searching premises without search warrant as incident to valid arrest. \b0 \i \ul0 23 L Ed 2d 966\b0 \i0 \ul0 . \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 Validity and construction of gun control laws. 28 ALR3d 845. \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 Validity of consent to search given by one in custody of officers. 9 ALR 3d 858. \par \pard \par \pard \qj \li0\ri0 \sb0 \fi0 Lawfulness of nonconsensual search and seizure without warrant, prior to arrest. 89 ALR2d 715. \par \sect \sectd \marglsxn1296\sbknone { \header \pard }\pard \par \hyphauto1}