823 S.W.2d 793 (1992)
The STATE of Texas, Appellant,
Francisca T. GARCIA, Appellee.
Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.
January 31, 1992.
795*795 Fred G. Rodriguez, Former Criminal Dist. Atty., Steven G. Hilbig, Criminal Dist. Atty., Juanita Vasquez, Jill Mata, Daniel Thornberry, Asst. Criminal Dist. Attys., San Antonio, Tex., for appellant.
Edward Camara, Robert Switzer, Switzer, Carroll & De Prado, San Antonio, Tex., for appellee.
Before REEVES, C.J., and PEEPLES and ONION, JJ.
The State appeals an order of the trial court dismissing the complaint and information charging the appellee with a Class B misdemeanor. See
TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC.ANN. art. 44.01(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991). The
appellee was charged with the offense of owning or operating a sexually
oriented commercial enterprise in Bexar County outside the corporate
limits of a city on or about July 8, 1989, without a valid permit issued
by the sheriff, an alleged violation of an order of the Commissioner's
Court of December 14, 1981.
The county regulations in question were adopted by the Commissioner's
Court of Bexar County pursuant to TEX.REV.CIV. STAT.ANN. art. 2372
(1979 Tex.Gen.Laws ch. 229, § 1 at 498). The purpose of the statute was to provide local governments a 796*796
means of regulating the location of certain sexually oriented
commercial enterprises by authorizing cities by ordinance and counties
by order of the Commissioners' Court to adopt regulations "restricting
the location of massage parlors, nude studios, modeling studios, love
parlors and other similar commercial enterprises whose major business is
the offering of a service which is intended to provide sexual
stimulation or sexual gratification to the customer." See Lindsay v. Papageorgiou, 751 S.W.2d 544, 545 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
The order of the Commissioners' Court adopted December 14,1981 is similar to the Harris County regulations set out in Stansberry, 613 F.2d at 1291 (Appendix B) and Schope v. State, 647 S.W.2d 675, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, pet. refd) (appendix). Tracking the statute, section 4(1) of the Bexar County Regulations provided:
(1) "Sexually Oriented Commercial Enterprise" means a massage parlor,
nude studio, modeling studio, love parlor, escort service and any other
similar commercial enterprise whose major business is the offering of a
service which is intended to provide sexual stimulations or sexual
gratification to the customer.
Section 5(a) exempted bookstores and movie theaters from the regulations. Section 6(a) provided:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to own or operate a Sexually
Oriented Commercial Enterprise at a location in the parts of the county
outside the corporate limits of a city without a valid permit issued
therefor by the Sheriff in accordance with the provisions of these
Section 18 of the regulations provided that a violation of any provision of the regulations was a Class B misdemeanor.
Appellee filed an amended motion to dismiss the complaint
and information in which she alleged inter alia, that the
Commissioners' Court order was "unconstitutionally vague, unreasonable,
overbroad," and did not apprise a citizen of what conduct is prescribed.
Appellee complained that the county regulations did not define the
terms "own" or "operate" or the statement "any other similar commercial
enterprise whose major business is the offering of a service which is
intended to provide sexual stimulation or sexual gratification to the
customer," and thus did not convey a sufficiently definite warning as to
what conduct is prescribed. Appellee cited no provision of the federal
or state constitutions in her motion.
On May 31 and June 6, 1990, the trial court conducted hearings on the
appellee's amended motion to dismiss. Neither the appellee nor the
State offered any evidence. The hearings consisted of legal arguments on
the motion. At the conclusion of the hearing on June 6, 1990, the trial
court granted the amended motion to dismiss the complaint
and information. On June 12, 1990, the trial court entered a written
order expressly superseding any previous order of the court. The written
order found that the Commissioners' Court order was:
"in violation of the laws and Constitutions of the State of
Texas and the United States, in that, it is unconstitutionally vague,
unreasonable, overbroad, and does not apprise a citizen of what conduct
is proscribed in that the terms "own", "operate" and "major business"
found within the order are not defined and therefore do not convey a
sufficiently definite warning as to what conduct is proscribed, or whose
conduct is to be regulated."
The order did not make reference to any provision of the federal or state constitutions.
In its sole point of error, the State urges that the trial court
erred in granting appellee's motion to dismiss the State's pleadings.
It is clear that the appellee made a facial attack upon the
Commissioners' Court order. Such facial challenge to a legislative act,
ordinance or order is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under 797*797 which the act, ordinance or order would be valid. Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).
In Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1190-91, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982), the United States Supreme Court wrote:
In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a
court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected
conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail. The
court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming
the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.
We turn first then to the trial court's finding that the order in
question was "overbroad" and "unreasonable." It must be initially
observed that an attack on a statute, ordinance or order as being
overbroad is normally and traditionally reserved for complaints
concerning First Amendment violations. Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).
The United States Supreme Court has not recognized an "overbreadth"
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d 697, 707 (1987). In Stansberry,
613 F.2d at 1288, the court observed that the Harris County Regulations
adopted under the authority of article 2372w did not attempt to zone
businesses such as bookstores or movie theaters, which fall within the
protection of the First Amendment, and that no First Amendment interests
were at stake there. See also Schope, 647 S.W.2d at 679.
The Bexar County Regulations likewise exempt bookstores and movie
theaters, and we find no First Amendment interests at stake here.
It is true that a statute, ordinance or order is considered
impermissibly overbroad if, in addition to proscribing activities which
may constitutionally be forbidden, it sweeps within its coverage speech or conduct which is protected by the First Amendment. Morehead v. State, 807 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Bynum, 767 S.W.2d at 772; Clark v. State, 665 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). However, if the questioned statute or ordinance proscribes both unlawful conduct and conduct protected by the First Amendment, this does not invariably mean that it will be considered overbroad in a constitutional sense. Bynum, 767 S.W.2d at 772. Only a statute that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated on its face. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2508, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987). The fact that the enforcement of a statute operates to prohibit and restrain freedom of speech does not itself mean that the statute is invalid. Allen v. State, 604 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).
In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 2183 n. 7, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981),
the court held that an ordinance prohibiting non-obscene nude dancing
violated the rights of free expression guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Court recognized, however, that a zoning law
may be upheld, even though it infringes upon a protected
activity, where the law is narrowly drawn to serve legitimate state
interests and does not necessarily interfere with First Amendment
freedoms. Thus, an ordinance is not invalid merely because it subjects
the commercial exploitation of materials protected by the First Amendment to licensing or zoning requirements. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976); Jolar Cinema of Houston v. City of Houston, 695 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ). The justification for the application of overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context. Bates v. State, 433 U.S. 350, 380, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2707, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).
Time, place and manner regulations that are content-neutral are
acceptable when they are designed to serve a substantial government
interest and do not unreasonbly 798*798 limit alternative avenues of communication. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986).
The county regulations in question are a content-neutral form of time,
place and manner restriction. The reasonableness of similar county
regulations and the substantial governmental interest involved has been
discussed in Stansberry, 613 F.2d at 1289. Further, Papageorgiou, 751 S.W.2d at 549-50, has been decided contrary to any claim that the county regulations reach a substantial amount of conduct protected
by article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution. We do not find the
Commissioners' Court order to "overbroad" or "unreasonable."
We now turn to the finding that the Commissioners' Court order in
question is vague. All penal laws must give notice to the populace as to
what activity is made criminal so as to provide fair notice to persons before making their activity criminal. Bynum, 767 S.W.2d at 773.
Any statute, ordinance or Commissioners' Court order must be
sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conducted is forbidden by the statute,
ordinance or order, and to avoid the possibility of arbitrary and
erratic arrests and convictions. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Stansberry, 613 F.2d at 1289; Gordon v. State, 757 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. refd).
A provision need not, however, be cast in terms that are mathematically
precise; it need only give fair warning of the conduct prescribed, in
light of common understanding and practices. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971). Stansberry, 613 F.2d at 1289; Gordon, 757 S.W.2d at 497.
The trial court's findings as to the vagueness challenge center on
the fact that the terms "own", "operate" and "major business" are not
defined in the county regulations or Commissioners' Court order.
Clearly, a statute, ordinance or order is not unconstitutionally vague
merely because the words or terms used are not specifically defined. Engelking v. State, 750 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).
When words in a statute or ordinance are not defined they are
ordinarily given their plain meaning without construction of penal laws
or laws on other subjects, unless the statute or ordinance clearly shows
that they were used in some other sense. Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 219 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988); Botello v. State, 720 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1986, pet. refd, untimely filed).
Whether the Code Construction Act (Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 311.001, et
seq.) (Vernon 1988) is applicable to a particular statute or ordinance,
the code may be looked to for guidance in interpreting the provisions of
the statute or ordinance. McGlothlin v. State, 749 S.W.2d 856, 857-58 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).
Thus, words and phrases within a statute or ordinance must be read in
the context in which they are used. TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a)
(Vernon 1988). Usually, the word or phrase must then be construed
according to the rules of grammar and common usage, unless the word or
phrase has acquired a technical or particular meaning. TEX.GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 311.011(a), (b) (Vernon 1988).
The words "own" and "operate" as used in section 6(a) of the
Commissioners' Court order, when given their plain meaning and read in
context, "give clear notice of the permit requirements to those who own
or run a business." See Memet v. State, 642 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, pet. refd). The meaning of the word "operate" is to run a business. Id.
"It is generally understood that the terms `operator' and `owner'
indicate those parties who manage and control a business enterprise." Courtney v. State, 639 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Tex.App—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, pet. refd). "Operating" a business is an act by one either in an ownership or management capacity and not a mere employee. Schope, 647 S.W.2d at 679-80.
The trial court in its findings concluded that the phrase "major business" is unconstitutionally vague.
By including the phrase "major business," the county commissioners have
excluded businesses whose activities might incidentally cause sexual
stimulation. Certainly no one would contend that the major business of
an art school or dance studio was the provision of services intended for
sexual gratification. Additional definiteness is provided by the fact
that the section specifically list three types of regulated
businesses—massage parlors—and applies the definition to "any other
similar commercial enterprise." We find that this definition is
sufficiently clear and provides adequate warning of the proscribed
Stansberry, 613 F.2d at 1290; see also Memet, 642 S.W.2d at 523. We conclude that the terms complained of are not unconstitutionally vague.
When challenging the constitutionality of a statute, ordinance or
order, it is incumbent upon a defendant to show that in its operation
the statute, ordinance or order is unconstitutional to her in her
situation; that it may be unconstitutional as to others is not
sufficient. Bynum, 767 S.W.2d at 774; Briggs v. State, 740 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Parent v. State, 621 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981).
The trial court's findings in the instant case could not have been
based on the Commissioners' Court order's application to the appellee,
as the appellee did not testify or offer any evidence to show her
particular situation. In short, appellee has not shown how the facts of
her case interact with the Commissioners' Court order. State v. Szela, et al, 820 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991). Further, the trial court cannot base its findings on hypothetical applications. Briggs, 740 S.W.2d at 806.
We find that the Commissioners' Court order attacked by appellee is not
facially unconstitutional. The trial court erred in so holding. The
State's point of error is sustained.
Appellee seeks to raise on appeal a basis for the unconstitutionality
of the Commissioners' Court order on which she secured no ruling from
the trial court. Appellate courts will not decide constitutional issues
on a broader basis than the record requires. Parent, 621 S.W.2d at 797; see also Briggs v. State, 740 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). In an appeal by the State under article 44.01, the defendant has no right to an interlocutory crossappeal. Kost v. State, 785 S.W.2d 936, 940 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, pet. refd).
The dismissal order of the trial court is set aside, and the cause is remanded.
 Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by assignment pursuant TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 74.003(b) (Vernon 1988).
 Article 2372w is set in Stansberry v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.1980)(Appendix A), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 886, 101 S.C.t. 240, 66 L.Ed.2d 112 (1980). Article 2372w was repealed by 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws ch. 149 § 49(1) at 1307 effective Sept. 1, 1987. Now see TEX.LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. chapter 243 (Vernon Supp.1991).